Duquesne Law Review
Volume 38
Number 3 The Pennsylvania Issue

Article 3

2000

Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law's Extension to Private Sector
Employees: Has the Time Finally Come to Broaden Statutory
Protection for all At-Will Employees?
Kurt H. Decker

Follow this and additional works at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Kurt H. Decker, Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law's Extension to Private Sector Employees: Has the Time
Finally Come to Broaden Statutory Protection for all At-Will Employees?, 38 Duq. L. Rev. 723 (2000).
Available at: https://dsc.duq.edu/dlr/vol38/iss3/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Duquesne Scholarship Collection. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Duquesne Law Review by an authorized editor of Duquesne Scholarship Collection.

Duquesne Law Review
Volume 38, Spring 2000, Number 3

Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law's Extension to
Private Sector Employees: Has the Time Finally
Come to Broaden Statutory Protection for all At-Will
Employees?
Kurt H. Decker*
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .................................................................

I.

AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT ...............................................

A.
B.
II.

United States .................................................
Pennsylvania.................................................

PENNSYLVANIA'S WHISTLEBLOWER LAW ............................

III.

PENNSYLVANIA'S

WHISTLEBLOWER

LAW'S

EXTENSION

TO

PRIVATE SECTOR EMPLOYEES .......................................

IV.

STATUTORY MODIFICATION OF AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT ..........

A.
*

724
731
731
735
743

Why Protect At-Will Employees Statutorily?.........

750
754
754

Adjunct professor, Widener University School of Law (Harrisburg, Pa.); adjunct

professor, Graduate School of Human Resource Management and Industrial Relations, Saint
Francis College (Loretto, Pa.); partner Stevens & Lee, Reading, Pennsylvania; B.A., Thiel
College; M.PA_, The Pennsylvania State University; J.D., Vanderbilt University School of Law;
L.L.M. (Labor), Temple University School of Law; and co-editor, Journal of Individual
Employment Rights.

Duquesne Law Review
B.
C.
D.
E.

Vol. 38:723

State Statutes Protecting At-Will Employees .........
Pennsylvania's Statutory Proposals....................
Proposed Statute .............................................
Analysis of Proposed Statute .............................

C ONCLUSIONS ..................................................................

760
765
770
789
792

INTRODUCTION

Anyone seeking symmetry and clearly discernable legal patterns
will not find them in employment law. Historically, employment law
has been a maze of conflicting statutes, common-law doctrines,
contract-established rules, and administrative agency findings. Even
within a narrow area, employment law may vary considerably on
the same issue, depending on whether an administrative agency or
a court is involved.'
Conflict between employee and employer lies at the heart of our
economic system and social structure. Employment law is
concerned with this conflict and its resolution. Statutes and court
decisions reflect this shifting conflict balance between employee
and employer, 2 making employment law one of the most political of
1. For example, the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB"), the administrative
agency created under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA'), at times does not follow or
acquiesce with the courts regarding the applicable NLRA employment law principle to follow
in the decisions it issues. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994). The NLRB's non-acquiescence with
court decisions has occurred over: (a) whether the NLRB should initially defer its review
procedures in unfair labor practice cases for resolution under the collective bargaining
agreement's grievance arbitration procedure; and (b) who constitutes a "successor" employer.
See I.P. HARDIN (ED.), THE DEVELOPING LABOR Law 761-850, 1008-84 (3d ed. 1992) [hereinafter
HARDIN, DEVELOPING LABOR LAw]; Maranville, Nonacquiescence: Outlaw Agencies, Imperial
Courts, and the Perils of Pluralism, 39 VAND. L. REV. 471 (1986); see also Charles G. Bakaly,
Jr. & James S. Bryan, Survival oY the BargainingAgreement: The Effect of Burns, 27 VAND.
L ,REV. 117 (1974); Peter G. Nash et al., The Development of the Co~lyer Deferral Doctrine,27
VAND. L REV. 23 (1974). Most courts have not taken kindly to the disrespect for judicial
authority reflected in an administrative agency's refusal to follow court decisions. See, e.g.,
NLRB v. Blackstone. Co., 685 F2d 102, 106 n.5 (3d Cir. 1982) ("We consider the Board's
contrary instructions to its administrative law judges to be completely improper and
reflective of a bureaucratic arrogance which will not be tolerated."). Similar nonacquiescence
by administrative agencies has occurred under the Occupational Safety and Health Act
("OSHA") of 1970 and the Social Security Act ("SSA"). See Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp. v.
Marshall, 636 F.2d 32, 33 (3d Cir. 1980) ("[T]he agency is not free to apply its own view of
the statute in contradiction of the view of the precedent of this Court."); Holden v. Heckler,
584 F Supp. 463, 474 (N.D. Ohio 1984) ("Notwithstanding these [court] rulings, the Secretary
[of Health, Education, & Welfare] has not applied [Hayes v. Secretary of Health, Education &
Welfare, 656 F2d 204 (6th Cir. 1981)] to any other disability terminations; rather she has
continued to instruct BDD [Ohio Bureau of Disability Determinations] and the ALI's
[administrative law judges] to follow SSA's regulations and internal procedures, mandating a
current disability standard.").
2. For discussion of the labor movement within the United States, see HARDIN,
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legal areas.3 Today, at-will employment is witnessing this conflict
4
shift between employee and employer.
DEVELOPING LABOR LAw, supra note 1, at 3-68. The NLRAs adoption in 1935 illustrates the
shifting conflict balance between employee and employer. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994). Prior
to the NLRAs adoption, three major themes illustrated this employee, union, and employer
conflict in that:
(1) The case law demonstrated that the courts were not institutionally capable of
formulating or implementing a uniform, cohesive, and workable labor policy;
(2) The course of legislative and judicial action revealed increasing awareness that
the role of organized labor presented a question of national proportions that no state
was capable of answering definitely on an individual basis; and
(3) There was the development of two mutually incompatible national policies
towards organized labor: one regarding it as creating market restraints inimical to the
national economy, and the other regarding it as necessary to a regime of industrial
peace based upon a balanced bargaining relationship between employers wielding the
combined power of incorporated capital wealth and unions wielding the power of
organized labor.
HARDIN, DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 1, at 3.
3. For a discussion of the pace of change in labor and employment law see R.
COVINGTON & K DECKER, INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELI,
chs. 1, 6 (1995)
[hereinafter COVINGTON & DECKER]. This pace of change has been characterized as follows:
The volume of labor and employment law has increased so dramatically the past three
decades that those who practice it often remark about how little of what they do in
1994 they would have been doing a generation earlier. This can be easily understood if
one simply chronicles a few of the major developments, beginning with the end of the
Second World War.
Id. at 12-15 (listing statutes and court decisions that influenced labor and employment law
since 1947).
4. The conflict between employee and employer that resulted in the NLR~s adoption
is similar to what is currently occurring under the at-will employment doctrine where either
the employee or the employer can terminate the employment relationship at any time, for
any or no reason, with or without notice. See supra note 2. Regarding the development of
the at-will employment doctrine and other areas of individual employee rights, see generally
KURT H. DECKER, A MANAGER'S GUIDE TO EMPLOYEE PRIVACY: LAws, PROCEDURES, AND POLICmS
(1989); KURT H. DECKER & H.T. FELIX, II, DRAFTING AND REVISING EMPLOYMENT HANDBOOKS (1991);
KuRT H. DECKER, DRAFTING AND REVISING EMPLOYMENT POLICIES AND HANDBOOKS (1994); KURT H.
DECKER, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY FORMS AND PROCEDURES (1988); KURT H. DECKER, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY
LAw AND PRACTICE (1987) [hereinafter DECKER, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY], KURT H. DECKER, HIRING
LEGALLY: A GUIDE FOR EMPLOYEES AND EMPLOYERS (2000); KURT H. DECKER, PRIVACY IN THE
WORKPLACE (1994); L LARSEN & P. BOROWSKY, UNJUST DISMISSAL (1987); J. GOODMAN (ED.),
EMPLOYEE RIGHTS LITIGATION: PLEADING & PRACTICE (1991); STEVEN PEPE & S. DUNHAM, AVOIDING
AND DEFENDING WRONGFUL DISCHARGE CLAIMS

(1990); H.

PERRIT,

EMPLOYEE DISMISSAL LAW

(3d

ed. 1992) [hereinafter PERRrrr, DISMISSAL LAW]; M. ROTHSTEIN et al., EMPLOYMENT LAw (2d ed.

1999). As Professor Perritt noted:
The most significant employment law development in the last quarter of the twentieth
century has been the erosion of the employment-at-will rule and the recognition of a
family of common law doctrines protecting employees against wrongful dismissal.
Under these wrongful dismissal doctrines, terminated employees may be able to
recover damages when they can show that their 'termination violated employer
promises, jeopardized clear public policies, or, sometimes, when the termination did
not comport with good faith and fair dealing.
These doctrines, or exceptions to the employment-at-will rule, were virtually unknown
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At-will employment allows either the employee or the employer

to terminate the employment relationship at any time, for any or no
reason, with or without notice.5 Despite criticism,6 Pennsylvania
before 1970. Until then, an employer could dismiss an at-will employee for any reason
or no reason, confident that the law provided the employee no remedy - unless one of
a handful of statutes prohibiting discrimination was violated. Now, the three wrongful
dismissal doctrines, more than a score of federal statutes, and scores of state statutes
provide legal redress where employees can show that their dismissals fit within the
factual circumstances covered by the doctrines or the statutes.
PERRrrr, DISMISSAL LAW at 3.
5. For example, the Restatement (Second) of Agency's Section 442 refers to at-will
employment as follows:
Unless otherwise agreed, mutual promises by principal and agent to employ and serve
create obligations to employ and to serve which are terminable upon notice by either
party; if neither party terminates the employment, it may terminate by lapse of time or
by supervening events.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 442 (1958).

6. Regarding the at-will employment doctrine's applicability and criticism in
Pennsylvania, see, e.g., Kurt H. Decker, At-Will Employment in Pennsylvania after "Banas"
and "Darlington:"New Concerns for a Legislative Solution, 32 VaL L REV. 101, 131 (1987)
("Perhaps the time has come to begin a thoughtful dialogue which will realistically address
this area of employment law through a statutory solution."); Kurt H. Decker, Federal
Regulation of At-Will Employment, 61 U. DET. J. URBAN. L 351, 360 (1984) ("Today, there is a
growing recognition that the at-will employee should be protected similar to the way most
public employees and union organized employees . . . are protected."); Kurt H. Decker,
Reinstatement as a Remedy for a Pennsylvania Employer's Breach of a Handbook or an
Employment Policy, 90 DICK L REV. 41, n. 189 (1985) ("Arbitration serves as an alternative
to traditional litigation of employee terminations arising under a collective bargaining
agreement, and provides a binding resolution more quickly and more inexpensively."); Kurt H
Decker, At-Will Employment in Pennsylvania - A Proposalfor its Abolition and Statutory
Regulation, 87 DICK L. REV. 477, 482 (1983) ("Perhaps the most significant recent legal
development affecting employment relations has been the modification of at-will employment
in a number of jurisdictions.") [hereinafter DECKER]; Kurt H Decker, At-Will Employment: A
Proposal for its Statutory Regulation, I HOFSTRA LAB. LF. 187, 189 (1983) "[T]he need to
protect the at-will employee who does not possess the bargaining power equal to that of an
employer has arrived."); Kurt H Decker, Handbooks and Employment Policies as Express or
Implied Guarantees of Employment - Employer Beware, 5 J.L & CoM. 207 (1984)
(suggesting "fairness" rationale for employers wishing to terminate at-will employees); Mark
R. Kramer, Comment, The Role of Federal Courts in Changing State Law: The Employment
At-Will Doctrine in Pennsylvania, 133 U. PA L REV. 227, 247 (1984) ("The trend toward
liberalization of the strict doctrine of employment at will . . . is unmistakable."); see also
James G. Fannon, The Public Policy Exception to the Employment At Will Doctrine:
Searchingfor Clear Mandates in the Pennsylvania Constitution, 27 RUTGERS LJ. 927 (1996);
Delores Jacobs Krawec, Comment, The Employment-at-Will Rule: The Development of
Exceptions and PennsylvaniasResponse, 21 DuQ. L. REV. 477 (1983).
Regarding the at-will employment doctrine's modification and criticism throughout the
United States, see PERRrIT, DISMISSAL LAw, supra note 4, at 3-26; Lawrence E. Blades,
Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of
Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L REV. 1404, 1416 (1967) ("[Tlhe philosophy [of at-will
employment] is incompatible with these days of large, impersonal, corporate employers; it
does not comport with the need to preserve individual freedom in today's job-oriented,
industrial society.") [hereinafter BLADES]; Cornelius J. Peck, Unjust Discharges from
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Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. LJ. 1, 4 (1979) ("(T]he
overwhelming importance of the employment relation to the individual employee, coupled
with the arbitrariness and capriciousness of a rule that permits the termination of that
relation without cause necessitates that the courts . . . reexamine the suitability of that
rule."); Theodore J. St. Antoine, The Right Not to be Fired Unjustly, 10 HUMAN RIGHTS 32, 53
(1982) ("Not a single respected and disinterested voice has been heard to suggest that there
is any valid, substantial reason for opposing the requirement of just cause.") [hereinafter ST.
ANTOINE, FIRED UNJUSTLY]; Clyde W. Summers, Protecting All Employees Against Unjust
Dismissal, 58 HARv. Bus. REV. 132, 134 (1980) ("The critical fact is that [the courts] have
perpetuated legal rules that run counter to accepted principles of personnel practices and
social values, . . . all sense of fairness, and all principles of due process."); Clyde W.
Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L
REv. 481, 484 (1976) ("[Tlhe anachronistic legal rule that employees can be discharged for
any reason or no reason should be abandoned.") [hereinafter SUMMERS]; see also Gill A.
Abramson & Stephen M. Selvestri, Recognition of a Cause of Action for Abusive Discharge
in Maryland, 10 BALT. L REV. 257 (1981); Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a
Theory of "Just Cause" in Employee Discipline Cases, 1985 DUKE LJ. 594 (1985) [hereinafter
AneRxms & NOLAN]; Addison & Castro, The Importance of Lifetime Jobs: Differences Between
Union and Nonunion Workers, 40 INDUS. & LAB. REL REV. 393 (1987); Deborah A. Ballam, The
Development of the Employment at Will Rule Revisited: A Challenge to Its Origins as Based
in the Development of Advanced Capitalism,13 HOFSTRA LAB. LJ. 75 (1995); Brian F Berger,
Defining Public Policy Torts in At-Will Dismissals, 34 STAN. L REV. 153 (1981); Aired W.
Blumrosen, Workers' Rights Against Employers and Unions: Justice Francis - A Judge for
Our Season, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 480 (1970); Elletta Sangrey Callahan, Employment at Will:
The Relationship Between Societal Expectations and the Law, 28 AM. Bus. LJ. 455 (1990);
Joseph DeGiuseppe, Jr., The Recognition of Public Policy Exceptions to the
Employment-At-Will Rule: A Legislative Function, 11 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 721 (1982); Joseph
DeGiuseppe, Jr., The Effect of the Employment-At-Will Rule on Employee Rights to Job
Security and Fringe Benefits, 10 FORDHAM URB. LJ 1 (1981); Jay M. Feinman, The
Development of the Employee-at-Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118 (1976) [hereinafter
FEINMAN]; Joseph Z. Fleming, Labor and Employment Law: Recent Developments - At-Will
Termination of Employment Has Not Been Terminated, 20 NOVA L REV. 437 (1995); William
B. Gould, IV, Stemming the Wrongful Discharge Tide: A Casefor Arbitration, 13 EMPLOYEE
REL. LJ. 404 (1987); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Wrongful Discharge: Toward a More Efficient
Remedy, 56 IND. LJ. 207 (1981); Donald H. Hermann & Yvonne S. Sor, Property Rights in
One's Job: The Casefor Limiting Employment-at-Will, 24 ARmz. L REV. 763 (1982); William R.
Jenkins, Federal Legislative Exceptions to the At-Will Doctrine: Proposed Statutory
Protection for Discharges Violative of Public Policy, 47 ALB. I REV. 466 (1983); Alan B.
Kasrueger, The Evolution of Unjust-Dismissal Legislation in the United States, 44 INDUS. &
LAB. REL REV. 644 (1991); Lewis, Employment Protection:A PreliminaryAssessment of the
Law of Unfair Dismissal, 12 INDUS. REL LJ. 19 (1981); Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil
Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a Coherent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST.
LJ. 1443 (1996); Madison, The Employee's Emerging Right to Sue for Arbitrary or Unfair
Discharge, 6 EMPL. REL L.J. 422 (1981); Marlin H. Malin, The Distributive and Corrective
Justice Concerns in the Debate Over Employment At-Will: Some Preliminary Thoughts, 68
CHI.-KENT L REv. 117 (1992); Kenneth C. Mennemeier, Protectionfrom Unjust Discharge:An
Arbitration Scheme, 19 HARV. J. LEGIS. 49 (1982) [hereinafter MENNEMEIER]; David Millon,
Default Rules, Wealth Distribution,and CorporateLaw Reform: Employment At Will Versus
Job Security, 146 U. PA. L. REv. 975 (1998); Andrew P Morriss, Developing a Frameworkfor
Empirical Research on the Common Law: General Principles and Case Studies of the
Decline of Employment-at-Will, 45 CASE W. RES. L. Rev.999 (1995); Sandra J. Mullings,
Truth-In-Hiring Claims and the At-Will Rule: Should an Employer Have a License to Lie?,
1997 COLUM. Bus. L REV. 105 (1997); Gary E. Murg & Clifford Scharman, Employment At
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courts have remained faithful to the doctrine with only minor
modifications being made to protect at-will employees.7
Will: Do the Exceptions Overwhelm the Rule?, 23 B.C. L. REV 329 (1982); Theodore A. Olsen,
Wrongful Discharge Claims by At Will Employees: A New Legal Concern for Employers, 32
LAB. LJ. 265 (1981); J. Wilson Parker, At-Will Employment and the Common Law: A Modest
Proposal to De-Marginalize Employment Law, 81 IOWA L REV. 347 (1995); Cornelius J. Peck,
Some Kind of Hearingfor Persons Dischargedfrom Private Employment, 16 SAN DIEGO L
REV. 313 (1979); Ellen Pierce et al., Employee Termination at Will: A PrincipledApproach,
28 VIL L REV. 1 (1982); Rasnic, Balancing Respective Rights in the Employment Contract:
Contrasting the U.S. "Employment-At-Will" Rule with the Worker Statutory Protections
Against Dismissal in European Community Countries, 4 D.C.L J. INT'L L. & PRAc. 441
(1995); Eva Robins, Unfair Dismissal: Emerging Issues in the Use of Arbitration as a
Dispute Resolution Alternative for the Non-Union Workforce, 12 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 437
(1983); St. Antoine, The Model Employment Termination Act: A Threat to Management or a
Long-Overdue Employee Right? 1993 PRoc. OF N.Y.U. 45TH ANN. NAT'L CONF. ON LAB. 270
(1993) [hereinafter ST. ANTOINE, MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT]; Shemaria-Weber, A
Remedy for Malicious Discharge of the At-Will Employee, 7 CONN. L. REV. 758 (1975);
Kenneth A. Sprang, Beware the Toothless Tiger: A Critique of the Model Employment
Termination Act, 43 Am. U. L. REV. 849 (1994) [hereinafter SPRANG]; Jack Stieber, Recent
Developments in Employment At-Will, 36 LAB. LJ. 557 (1985); Jack Stieber, Protection
Against Unjust Discharge: The Need for a Federal Statute, 16 U. MICH. J.L REFORM 319
(1983); Vernon & Gray, Termination at Will - The Employer's Right to Fire, 6 EMPL REL
LJ. 25 (1981); Marsha Weisburst, Guidelines for a Public Policy Exception to the
Employment At Will Rule: The Wrongful Discharge Tort, 13 CONN. L. REV. 617 (1981); Cortlan
H. Maddux, Comment, Employer Beware! The Emerging Use of Promissory Estoppel as an
Exception to Employment At Will Rule, 49 BAYLOR L REV. 197 (1997); Kim Sheenan,
Comment, Has Employment-at-Will Outlived its Usefulness? A Comparison of U.S. and
New Zealand Employment Law, 28 CAL W. INT'L L.J. 323 (1997); Susan Sauter, Comnent,
The Employee Health and Safety Whistleblower Protection Act and the Conscientious
Employee: The Potentialfor Federal Statutory Enforcement of the Public Policy Exception
to Employment At Will, 59 U. CIN. L REV. 513 (1990); Mark D. Wagoner, Jr., Comment, The
Public Policy Exception to the Employment at Will Doctrine in Ohio: A Need for a
Legislative Approach, 57 OHIO ST. LJ. 1799 (1996); Janice E. Lynn, Note, Job Security for the
At Will Employee: ContractualRight of Dischargefor Cause, 57 CHI-KENT L REV. 697 (1981);
David Peck, Note, The Public Policy Exception to the Employment-at-Will Rule: Illinois
Creates an Amorphous Tort, 59 CH-KENT L REV. 247 (1982); Note: Employer Opportunism
and the Need for a Just Cause Standard, 103 HARV. L. 510 (1989); Note, Protecting At Will
Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93
HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1980); Thomas Gelb, Note, Non-Statutory Causes of Action for an
Employers Termination of an 'At Will' Employment Relationship: A Possible Solution to
the Economic Imbalance in the Employer-Employee Relationship, 24 N.Y.L SCH. L. REV. 743
(1979); Kathleen C. McGowan, Note, Unequal Opportunity in At-Will Employment: The
Search for a Remedy, 72 ST. JOHN'S L REV. 141 (1998); J. Peter Shapiro & James F Tune,
Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335 (1974) [hereinafter NOTE,
STANFORD]; Janet Gilligan Abaray, Note, The Development of Exceptions to At-Will
Employment: A Review of the Case Law from Management's Viewpoint, 51 U. CIN. L. REV.
616 (1982); Gregory Mark Munson, Note, A Straitjacketfor Employment At-Will: Recognition
Breach of Implied Contract Actions for Wrongful Demotion, 50 VAND. L REV. 1577 (1997).
7. Spierling v. First Am. Home Health Serv., 737 A.2d 1250, 1254 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999)
(reiterating the at-will employment doctrine's continued viability in Pennsylvania by
upholding a nurse's termination who claimed she was wrongfully terminated for reporting
evidence of Medicaid fraud to her immediate supervisor as part of the recognized public
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In 1992, the Pennsylvania legislature adopted the Whistleblower
Law.8 The Law statutorily codified at-will employment's public
policy "whistleblowing" exception. 9
Initially, the Whistleblower Law was thought to only protect
public employees. 10 However, recently the Pennsylvania Superior
policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine by finding that there was no federal or
state statute that required the nurse to report this fraud). See infra notes 40-69 and
accompanying text.
8. PA- STAT ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1421-1428 (West 1991) (hereinafter "the Law"). See also
infra notes 70-99 and accompanying text.
9. "Whistleblowing" generally involves reporting to the employer or to government
authorities the employer's or an employee's allegedly unlawful or improper conduct. It
essentially involves instances of either: (1) protective whistleblowing; or (2) active
whistleblowing. "Protective whistleblowing" occurs when the employee is asked to commit a
crime. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (termination for refusal
to participate in price fixing plan; termination unlawful); Petermann v. Teamsters Local 396,
344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (employee's refusal to commit perjury before a state
legislative committee as instructed by the employer; termination unlawful). "Active
whistleblowing" involves the employee seizing the initiative and disclosing his/her suspicions,
which may or may not be well-founded, of employer wrongdoing or waste, to either the
employer or government authorities. See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 421 N.E.2d
876 (I1. 1981) (reporting suspected criminal activity of another employee to police;
termination unlawful); Harless v. First Nat'l Bank in Fairmont, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978)
(protesting employer's practice of making illegal loan charges in contravention of state and
federal regulations; termination unlawful).
10. See Gallant v. BOC Group, Inc., 886 F. Supp. 202 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding that the
scope of Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law is limited to employees terminated from
governmental entities or any other "public body" which is created or funded by the
government; former employee of private, for profit company could not maintain claim
against company because company was a private corporation and was not funded in any
way by the government); Clark v. Modern Group Ltd., 9 F3d 321 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that
under Pennsylvania Law, Whistleblower Law is not indicator of public policy in private
termination cases; there is no general public policy of protecting whistleblowers who are not
employed in the public sector); Johnson v. Resources for Human Dev., Inc., 843 F Supp. 974
(E.D. Pa. 1994), aff'd, 77 F3d 462 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding that the Pennsylvania
Whistleblower Law applies only to public employees who good faith report instances of
wrongdoing or waste to an employer or appropriate authority); Cohen v. Salick Health Care,
Inc., 772 F. Supp. 1521 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that the receipt of Medicaid reimbursement
by private corporation, which was in business of operating and managing hospital-based
out-patient cancer treatment centers throughout nation, was insufficient to bring corporation
within definition of "public body" under Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law; it was not
Pennsylvania legislature's intention to include doctors and other health care providers as
funded public bodies under the Law); Wagner v. General Electric Co., 760 F Supp. 1146 (E.D.
Pa. 1991) (holding that the Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law would not support wrongful
termination action by at-will employee allegedly terminated in reprisal for making critical
and derogatory analysis of employer's products to customer, as scope of Law was limited to
public or quasi-public employees); Holewinski v. Children's Hospital of Pittsburgh, 649 A.2d
712 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994), appeal denied, 659 A.2d 560 (Pa 1995) (holding that the
Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law applies only to employees terminated from governmental
entities and, thus did not protect private sector hospital employee from termination allegedly
due to her whistleblowing conduct); Krajsa v. Keypunch, Inc., 622 A.2d 355 (Pa. Super. Ct.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 38:723

Court extended the Law's protections to private sector employees."
These decisions further judicially modified Pennsylvania's at-will
12
employment doctrine.
As the new millennium dawns, this development 3 extending the
Whistleblower Law's1 4 coverage to private sector employers will
generate even further attempts by employees to judicially modify
the at-will employment doctrine to protect an even broader
employee group. Perhaps the superior court's 15 recent modification

of the doctrine should serve as a beginning point for interested
parties to renew discussions over: (1) whether the Pennsylvania
legislature should statutorily abrogate or modify the doctrine, 16 or
(2) whether Pennsylvania courts should continue the doctrine's
conservative piecemeal modification. 7
This article examines the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law's
recent extension to private sector employees and its implications
for further modifying at-will employment. 8 It reviews: (1) at-will
employment in the United States and Pennsylvania; 19 (2) the
1993) (holding that the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law did not apply to wrongful
termination claim of at-will employee of private company that performed government
contracts; scope of law was limited to employees terminated from governmental entities or
other entities created or funded by government). See infra notes 100-135 and accompanying
text.
11. See, e.g., Riggio v. Burns, 711 A.2d 497 (Pa, Super. Ct. 1998) (en banc), appeal
dismissed, 739 k2d 161 (Pa. 1999) (holding that a private sector employer may be an agent
of a public body extending Whistleblower Law's protections); see also Denton v. Silver
Stream Nursing and Rehabilitation Ctr., 739 A.2d 571 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (holding that a
receipt by private sector employer of Medicaid funding is sufficient to qualify as a "public
body" for purposes of Whistleblower Law, which defines employer as an agent of a public
body). See infra notes 100-135 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 40-69 and accompanying text.
13. See, e.g., Riggio, 711 A.2d at 497; see also Denton, 739 A.2d at 571.
14. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1421-1428 (West 1991).
15. See, e.g., Riggio, 711 A.2d at 497; see also Denton, 739 A.2d at 571.
16. See infra notes 136-264 and accompanying text.
17. Some Pennsylvania appellate decisions have indicated that courts are not
institutionally capable of formulating or implementing a workable policy to address the
needs of employees and employers involved in at-will employment terminations and that this
is best left to the legislative process. They have taken this position to limit at-will
employment's modification and its change, if any, to the legislature. See generally, Veno v.
Meredith, 515 A2d 571, 579 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) appeal denied, 616 A.2d 986 (Pa. 1992);
Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 511 A2d 830, 841 (Pa. Super Ct. 1986) appeal denied, 523
A.2d 1132 (Pa. 1987); Darlington v. General Elec., 504 A.2d 306, 309 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986); see
also In re Hotstuf Foods, Inc., 95 B.R. 355, 357 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1989) and supra note 6
(regarding commentaries that have criticized the at-will employment doctrine and/or
recommended a statutory solution).
18. See, e.g., Riggio, 711 A.2d at 497; see also Denton, 739 A.2d at 571.
19. See infra notes 23-69 and accompanying text.
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Whistleblower Law;20 (3) recent decisions extending the
Whistleblower Law's protections to certain private sector
employees;2 1 and (4) the possibility of statutory protection of at-will
22
employees.
I.

A.

AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT

United States

The at-will employment doctrine emerged in the United States
not as an outgrowth of English common law, but as a unique
development catalyzed by a single legal treatise.- Wood's
formulation of the doctrine was unambiguous: "[w]ith us, the rule
is inflexible, that a general or indefmnite hiring is prima facie a

hiring at will ..

Quickly adopted by the courts,25 the new

".."24

doctrine's application was equally straightforward. 26 An employer
could terminate "for good cause, for no cause, or even for cause
2
morally wrong without being thereby guilty of a legal wrong."
Many legal historians have observed that the at-will employment
doctrine's ready acceptance reflected its compatibility with the era's
contractual law and prevailing principles of laissez faire economic
theory. 28 From the end of the nineteenth century until the
20. See infra notes 70-99 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 100-135 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 136-264 and accompanying text.
23. The at-will employment doctrine was first articulated in Horace G. Wood's 1877
treatise Law of Master & Servant. HORACE G. WOOD, LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 277 (1877)
[hereinafter WOOD, MASTER AND SERVANT]. See SUMMERS, supra note 6, at 485. Wood did not
follow the traditional English view that all hirings were presumed to be for one year, a rule
he claimed, without basis, had not been followed at the time of his writing in this country.
However, early American courts had adopted the English approach. PHILIP SELZNIcK LAW
SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE 133 (1969); see, e.g., Davis v. Groton, 16 N.Y. 255 (1857).
Moreover, the four cases Wood cited as authority for his position did not support his theory.
Nevertheless, Wood succeeded in resolving confusion in the traditional law of
master-servant, and made clear that all employment relationships, not just those of a
domestic nature, were to be covered by the at-will employment doctrine. See NOTE, STANFORD,
supra note 6, at 341-43.
24. WOOD, MASTER & SERVANT, supra note 23, at 277.
25. For example, the New York Court of Appeals adopted Wood's rule in Martin v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 42 N.E. 416 (N.Y. 1895). In the subsequent two decades, two thirds of the
30 cases involving an employment contract's duration were decided against the employee
using the new at-will employment doctrine. FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 125-27.
26. FEINMAN, supra note 6, at 126.
27. Payne v. Western & Atl..R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other
grounds, Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915).
28. See SUMMERS, supra note 6. See also BLADES, supra note 6. Contra FEINMAN, supra
note 6 (arguing that "the explanation for the at-will employment doctrine was its role as an
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mid-1930s, the United States Supreme Court repeatedly further
entrenched the doctrine within the employment relationship by
striking down state legislation protective of employees using
doctrines intrinsic to contract law, including "liberty of contract,"
and "mutuality of obligation."29 Courts turned a blind eye to the
realities created by the power imbalance between employee and
employer.3 0 They upheld a doctrine enabling employers to terminate
employees for any reason that protected employers from liability
31
even for abusive terminations.
adjunct in the development of advanced capitalism rather than its relationship to concepts
within contract law").
29. The paradigmatic case representing the now discredited era of substantive due
process was Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), which struck down a state law
prohibiting bakers from working more than ten hours a day on the basis of the inviolability
of "freedom of contract." However, well before Lochner, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
decided the first case in the nation affecting factory wage labor, invalidating, again on the
basis "liberty of contract," a Pennsylvania statute that required all laborers "in and around
the state's iron mills" be paid their wages at regular intervals and in cash. Godcharles v.
Wigeman, 6 A- 354 (Pa. 1886). The statute sought to end a fundamental abuse endured by
nineteenth century workers; i.e., "the 'truck system' of paying workers in 'scrip,' or 'orders,'
redeemable only at company or 'truck stores.' " William E. Forbath, The Ambiguities of Free
Labor: Labor and Law in the Gilded Age, Wis. L REv. 767, 796 (1985) [hereinafter FORBATH].
"The system originated in rural towns built from scratch by a mine, mill, or factory owner
[where] the corporation often owned everything from church and school to houses and
stores." Id. at 796. "From a worker's perspective life . . . consisted of almost unbroken
dependency. Receiving clothing and food for one's labor smacked of slavery. Debts to the
company stores fastened workers to the mines and factories and the stores' monopolies
enabled companies to charge above market prices for the groceries and other provisions
.... " Id. at 796-797. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, however, found that the statute was
"an insulting attempt to put the laborers under a legislative tutelage, which is not only
degrading to his manhood, but subversive of his rights as a citizen of the United States."
Godcharles, 6 K at 437.
30. For employees, the freedom of "liberty of contract" was illusory. Labor leaders in
the nineteenth century bluntly asked how much this abstract right was worth without the
power to exercise it. FORBATH, supra note 29, at 811. Their answer was equally to the point:
"The laborer's commodity perishes everyday beyond possibility of recovery. He must sell
today's labor today or never ... An empty stomach can make no contracts. The workers do
not consent, they submit but they do not agree." FORBATH, supra note 29, at 811 (quoting
labor leader George E. McNeil of the Eight Hour League). Indeed, the reality of employees
in factories and sweatshops across the country was poverty and degradation, conditions that
led to not infrequent uprisings, violence, and bloodshed. Pennsylvania's own history carries
the indelible mark of the Molly Maguires, the Homestead Strike, and the Lattimer massacre,
all desperate attempts by hapless and powerless employees to exercise some control over
the unbearable hardships faced in the anthracite coal fields, steel mills, and factories. See
generally PAUL JOHNSON, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (1997); SAMUEL ELIOT MORISON,
THE OXFORD HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE: 1869 THROUGH THE DEATH OF JOHN F. KENNEDY,
1963 (1994);

'MICHAEL

NOvAK, THE GUNS OF LATTIMER (1996).

31. See generally Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), and Copage v. Kansas, 236
U.S. 1 (1915), both striking down statutes prohibiting an employer from terminating an
employee because of union membership. One commentator put it succinctly:
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Over ensuing decades, inequities resulting from the at-will
employment doctrine became more apparent leading both
legislatures and courts to modify the doctrine by shielding some
employees from the employer's unbridled power.3 2 In addition to
statutory protections, state courts, in particular, during the last
quarter century began fashioning remedies for wrongful
termination, including theories based on an implied-in-fact
contract,3 implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing,3
In the late 19th century the [U.S. Supreme] Court strongly endorsed the freedom of
enterprise rationale and declared the right of an employer to dispense with the
services of an employee is equivalent to the right of the employee to quit. The Court
dispensed with the argument that differences in bargaining power rendered
employment at will unjust by asserting the necessity of recognizing "as legitimate
those inequalities of fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise" of contract
and property rights.
NOTE, STANFORD, supra note 6, at 346-347 (footnotes omitted).
32. Federal legislation, for example, protects individual employees from termination
under(1) The National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1998);
(2) 'Ttle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 2002-17 (1998);
(3) The Age Discrinunation in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1998);
(4) The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1998);
(5) The Vocational Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796 (1998);
(6) The Vietnam Era Veterans Readjustment Assistance Act, 38 U.S.C. §§
2021(a)(A)(i), 2021(a)(B), 2021(b)(1), 2024 (1998);
(7) The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1998);
(8) The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1976, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-209 (1998); and
(9) The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, §§ 1140-41 (1998).
State statutes contain similar limitations. See, e.g., PA STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-963 (West
1991) (Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, prohibiting various forms of discrimination
involving age, sex, race, religion, etc.). For a more comprehensive discussion of federal and
state statutory modifications to the at-will employment doctrine see COVINGTON & DECKER,
supra note 3, at chs. 1, 6; DECKER, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY, supra note 4, at ch. 2.
33. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981) (holding
that the presumption that an employment contract is intended to be terminable at-will is
subject, like any presumption, to contrary evidence which may take the form of an
agreement, express or implied, that the relationship will continue for some fixed time period;
oral promise enforceable where employer's practice was to terminate only for just cause);
see also Bower v. A.T. & T. Tech., Inc., 852 F2d 361 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that laid-off
employees could sue their employer for compensatory damages over failing to keep promise
of re-employment following a corporate restructuring); Panto v. Moore Bus. Forms, Inc., 547
A.2d 260 (N.H. 1988) (holding that an employer's promise to continue salary, pension, and
insurance benefits for three months after possible layoffs could constitute an enforceable
unilateral contract, if there was an offer that was accepted by an employee continuing to
perform his/her regular duties). But see Miller v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 259 Cal. Rptr. 56
(Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (granting summary judgment for employer where the only evidence of
an implied contract was the employee's longevity of service, regular salary increases, and
promotions, which should not change an at-will employee's status to one that is terminable
only for cause).
34. See, e.g., Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977)
(holding that in the absence of express individual contractual rights a covenant of good faith
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creation of contractual rights in employment handbooks and
36
policies, 35 and public policy exceptions.
Despite these statutory and judicial modifications, the at-will
employment doctrine remains alive and well within the United
States. No one statute or court case has completely abrogated the
doctrine to require that as a matter of public policy an at-will
employee can only be terminated for some form of "cause." Only
one state has adopted legislation abrogating the doctrine.3 7 As the
new millennium dawns, the common law presumption that
employment is at-will still predominates, 3 despite piecemeal
39
judicial attempts to modify it.

and fair dealing is implicit in the employment contract; terminating salesperson to avoid
paying earned commissions breached contract); see also Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc.,
168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (holding employment contract, like all contracts,
includes an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing). But see Murphy v. American
Home Prods, Inc., 448 N.E.2d 86 (N.Y. 1983) (refusing to imply a covenant of good faith and
fair dealing when it would be inconsistent with other terms of the contractual relationship).
35. See, e.g., Wooley v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1258 (N.J. 1985),
modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985) (finding "absent a clear and prominent disclaimer [that
employment is at-will], an implied promise contained in an employment handbook that an
employee will be fired only for cause [may be enforceable] against [an] employer even when
employment was for an indefinite term and would otherwise be terminable at-will"); see also
Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So.2d 725, 734-35 (Ala 1987) (holding that
provisions in an employment handbook plus continued employment following receipt of
handbook created unilateral contract that modified at-will relationship); Toussaint v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W2d 880 (Mich. 1980) (holding that assurances in handbook that
employee would only be terminated for "just cause" enforceable against employer); Mobil
Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704 P.2d 702 (Wyo. 1985) (finding at-will employee's
termination unlawful where employer failed to follow the progressive discipline system it
had established in its employment manual). But see Fiscella v. General Accident Ins. Co., 114
L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2611 (E.D. Pa- 1983), affd without op., 735 F2d 1348 (3d Cir. 1984) (holding
that progressive discipline system in employment handbook not enforceable upon employer
to terminate an at-will employee only for "just cause").
36. See, e.g., Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979)
(terminating an employee for refusing to take a polygraph examination); Tameny v. Atlantic
Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330, (Cal. 1980) (terminating an employee for refusing to participate
in an employer's illegal price-fixing scheme); Petermann v. International Bd. of Teamsters,
Inc., 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (terminating an employee for refusing to commit
perjury at the employer's command); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d 353 (Ill.2d 1978)
(terminating an employee for filing workers' compensation claims); Nees v. Hocks, 536 P.2d
512 (Or. 1975) (terminating an employee for serving on a jury). But see Jones v. Keogh, 409
A-2d 581 (Vt. 1979) (finding no public policy violation for terminating an employee for taking
too much sick leave); Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 290 N.W.2d 536 (Wis. 1980) (finding no public
policy violation for terminating employee for cohabitating with one employee while having
an affair with a married co-employee).
37. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-902 to 39-2-914 (1998); see infra notes 182-197 and
accompanying text.
38. See Summers, supra note 6, at 491.
39. See supra notes 23-38 and accompanying text.
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B. Pennsylvania
In Pennsylvania, the at-will employment doctrine was judicially
adopted in Henry v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie Rail Road.40 The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that an employee may be
terminated "with or without cause, at pleasure, unless restricted by
and want of probable cause
some contract,... questions of malice
41
case."
the
with
do
to
[nothing]
have
The at-will employment doctrine remained unassailable for nearly
eight decades until Geary v. United States Steel Corp.,42 where the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court in dicta recognized that there were
"areas of an employee's life in which his employer has no
legitimate interest."" The majority concluded that, although there
was no compelling public policy under the case's facts, an
employee's termination might give rise to a cause of action where a
clear mandate of public policy was violated."
In concluding that an employee's termination might be actionable
in certain circumstances, the Geary court acknowledged what
earlier Pennsylvania courts had been unwilling to recognize:
[Hiuge corporate enterprises which have emerged in this
century wield an awesome power over their employees. It has
been aptly remarked that "[wie have become a nation of
employees. We are dependent upon others for our means of
livelihood, and most of our people have become completely
40. 21 A- 157 (Pa. 1891).
41. Henry, 21 A. at 157.
42. 319 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1974). Geary's duties involved the sale of tubular products to the
oil and gas industry. Id. at 175. His employment was at-will. Id. The dismissal is said to have
stemmed from a disagreement concerning one of the company's new products, a tubular
casing designed for use under high pressure. Id. Geary alleged that he believed the product
had not been adequately tested and constituted a serious danger to anyone who used it; that
he voiced his misgivings to his superiors and was ordered to "follow directions," which he
agreed to do; that he nevertheless continued to express reservations, taking his case to a
vice-president in charge of sale of the product; that as a result of his effort, the product was
re-evaluated and withdrawn from the market. Id. Despite these actions, which were in the
public's and the company's best interest, he was summarily terminated. Id.
43. Geary, 319 A.2d at 180. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated:
It may be granted that there are areas of an employee's life in which his employer has
no legitimate interest. An intrusion into one of the areas by virtue of the employer's
power of discharge might plausibly give rise to a cause of action, particularly where
some recognized facet of public policy is threatened ... We hold only that where the
complaint itself discloses a plausible and legitimate reason for terminating an at-will
employment relationship and no clear mandate of public policy is violated thereby, an
employee at-will has no right of action against his employer for wrongful discharge.
Id.
44. Id.
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dependent upon wages. If they lose their jobs they lose every
resource, except for the relief supplied by the various forms of
social security. Such dependence of the mass of the people
upon others for all of their income is something new in the
world. For our generation, the substance of life is in another
man's hands."4 5
Geary's recognition of a public policy exception set the stage for
subsequent attempts to modify the doctrine; 46 however, on balance
47
the court recognized that this could cause problems.
Since Geary, Pennsylvania courts have struggled to determine
when a public policy interest constitutes "a violation of a clearly
mandated public policy which strikes at the heart of a citizen's
social right, duties, and responsibilities," 48 sufficiently compelling to
49
justify a wrongful termination claim.
Public policy violations have been found for terminating an

employee for serving on a jury,50 refusing to hire a prospective
employee for failing to disclose a pardoned conviction, 51 and

terminating an employee for reporting a violation of federal nuclear
regulations.5 2 In each case where the employee was successful, the
45.

Id. at 176 (quoting FRANK TANNENBAUM, A PHILOSOPHY OF LABOR 9 (1975)).

46. See infra notes 48-69 and accompanying text.
47. Geary, 319 A.2d at 179. The Supreme Court indicated that: (1) suits of this nature
could impact on the "legitimate interests of employers in hiring and retaining the best
personnel available" and "inhibit the critical judgments by employers concerning employee
qualifications," and (2) suits of this nature could "impose a heavy burden upon the judicial
system in terms of [both] an increased case load and thorny problems of proof . . . ." Id.
Justice Roberts authored a dissenting opinion in which he diverged on this very point
concluding that, "society's interest in protecting itself from dangerous products manifestly
presents a mandate to the court to recognize a cause of action for wrongful termination." Id.
at 180 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Justices Nix and Manderino also dissented. Id. (Roberts, J.,
dissenting).
48. Paul v. Lankenau Hosp., 543 A.2d 1148, 1155 (Pa- Super. Ct. 1990), afffd, 569 A.2d
346 (Pa, 1990), (quoting Turner v. Letterkenny Fed. Credit Union, 505 A.2d 259, 261 (Pa.
Super. Ct.) (quoting Novose v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F2d 894, 899 (3d Cir. 1983))).
49. For example, in Cisco v. United Parcel Service, Inc., the Pennsylvania Superior
Court observed: "The sources of public policy [which may limit the employer's right of
discharge] include legislation; administrative rules, regulation, or decision; and judicial
decision. In certain instances, a professional code of ethics may contain an expression of
public policy . . . . Absent legislation, the judiciary must define the cause of action in
case-by-case determinations." Cisco v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 476 A.2d 1340, 1343 (Pa,
Super. Ct. 1984) (quoting Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 417 A.2d 505, 572 (N.J.
1980)). However, the employee in Cisco was not permitted to recover against the employer
even though the employee had been cleared of any criminal wrongdoing for theft for which
he was terminated and denied reinstatement by the employer. Cisco, 476 A.2d at 344.
50. See Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, 386 A.2d 119 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978).
51. See Hunter v. Port Auth. Of Allegheny County, 419 A.2d 631 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980).
52. See Field v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 565 A.2d 1170, 1179-82 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989).
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court found pertinent statutes and case law to ascertain the
specific public policy violated.53 Even though acknowledging the
public policy exception's existence since Geary,54 Pennsylvania
courts have been less than eager to liberally apply it in the majority
of cases decided during the past quarter century to set aside
55
employee terminations.
53. See, e.g., Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, 963 F2d 611 (3d Cir. 1993) (refusing to submit
to a drug test and personal property search violated the employee's privacy); Woodson v.
AMF Leisureland Centers, Inc., 842 F2d 699 (3d Cir. 1988) (refusing to serve a visibly drunk
individual); Novosel v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 721 F2d 894 (3d Cir. 1983) (refusing to
lobby for legislation supported by the employer); Perks v. Firestone & Rubber Co., 611 F2d
1363 (3d Cir. 1979) (refusing administration of a statutorily prohibited polygraph
examination); Godwin v. Visiting Nurse Ass'n Home Health Serv., 831 F. Supp. 449 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (refusing to falsify Medicare reimbursement claims); Sorge v. Wright's Knitwear Corp.,
832 F. Supp. 118 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (reporting violations under the federal Occupational Safety
and Health Act); Hanson v. Gichner Sys. Group, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 403 (M.D. Pa 1993)
(refusing to lie to federal investigators); Brown v. Hammond, 810 F. Supp. 644 (E.D. Pa.
1993) (refusing to bill time at attorney's hourly rate); Paralegal v. Lawyer, 783 F. Supp. 230
(E.D. Pa. 1992) (reporting lawyer's violation of the Code of Conduct); Burns v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 757 F Supp. 518 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (filing workeirs' compensation claim); Kilpatrick
v. Delaware Soc'y. for Prevention of Cruelty of Animals, 632 F Supp. 542 (E.D. Pa. 1986)
(complaining about occupational hazards to a state agency); Sugarman v. RCA Corp., 639 F
Supp. 780 (M.D. Pa. 1985) (alleging specific intent to harm may support public policy claim);
Hansrote v. American Indus. Techniques, Inc., 586 F Supp. 113 (W.D. Pa. 1984), affd, 770
F2d 1070 (3d Cir. 1985) (refusing to commit a criminal offense); Shipkowski v. United States
Steel Corp., 585 F Supp. 66 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (terminating an employee to substantially reduce
pension benefits); Shaw v. Russel Trucking Lines, Inc., 542 F Supp. 776 (W.D. Pa. 1982)
(reporting illegal acts regarding motor vehicle code violations); McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474
F Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (refusing to participate in an allegedly illegal price-fixing
scheme); Rettinger v. American Can Co., 574 F Supp. 306 (M.D. Pa. 1983) (retaliating for
filing a workers' compensation claim); Shick v. Shirey, 716 A.2d 1231 (Pa. 1998) (filing
workers' compensation claim); Hunger v. Grand Central Sanitation,. 670 A.2d 173 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1996) (holding termination violated the Pennsylvania Crimes Code); Raykovitz v. K-Mart
Corp., 665 A.2d 833 (445 Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (retaliating for filing an unemployment
compensation claim); Highhouse v. Avery Transp., 660 A.2d 1374 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995)
(retaliating for filing an unemployment compensation claim); Perry v. Tioga County, 649 A.2d
186 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (refusing to perform illegal activities); Kroen v. Bedway Security
Agency, Inc., 633 A.2d 628 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (refusing to submit to a statutorily prohibited
polygraph examination); Mudd v. Hoffman Homes for Youth, Inc., 543 A.2d 1092 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1988) (preventing pension benefits from vesting).
54. 319 A.2d at 174.
55. See, e.g., Clark v. Modern Group, Ltd. et al., 9 F3d 321 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding an
employee who was terminated after objecting to his employer's refusal to report as taxable
income certain auto expense reimbursements to its executives as required by federal tax
laws could not claim a wrongful termination under the public policy exception because the
exception does not extend to cases in which the underlying act of the employer is not in
fact unlawful even if the employee "reasonably believes" that the act is unlawful); Murray v.
Gencorp., Inc., 979 F Supp. 1045 (E.D. Pa. 1997) (employee's claim that he was terminated
due to employer's fear that he might be injured and file workers' compensation claim did not
state a public policy violation); Wade v. Metropolitan Life Insurance, 13 I.E.R. Cas.(BNA) 427
(E.D. Pa. 1997), aff'd, 160 F3d 480 (3d Cir. 1998) (employee who alleged he voluntarily left
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insurance company on disability leave due to stress he was suffering as a result of his
refusal to participate in fraudulent insurance sales scheme and that company wrongfully
terminated him for failing to participate in scheme had no public policy claim); Pellegrino v.
McMillen Lumber Prods. Corp., 16 F. Supp.2d 574 (W.D. Pa. 1996) (timing of employee's
termination, prior to end of employer's fiscal year and fact that it resulted in an incidental
loss of benefits, was insufficient to establish that she was terminated for the specific
purpose of depriving her of additional pension benefits); Green v. Bryant, 887 F. Supp. 798
(E.D. Pa, 1995) (finding that where a terminated employee was the victim of a crime, no
public policy violated); Frankel v. Warwick Hotel, 881 F. Supp. 183 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (holding
no violation of public policy where employee was terminated by his father allegedly because
employee would not divorce his wife); Brosso v. Devices for Vascular Intervention, Inc., 879
F Supp. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1995), aff'd, 74 F.3d 1225 (3d Cir. 1995) (holding no claim for public
policy violation where sales manager for medical-device company who alleged that he was
terminated for failing to relinquish ownership of his design of mechanical thrombectomy
catheter); Mulgrew v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 868 F Supp. 98 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding no
violation of public policy where employee, who was 38 at the time of his termination, was
allegedly terminated to prevent him from fling an age discrimination claim when he turned
40); Wagner v. General Electric Co., 760 F. Supp. 1146 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (holding termination
for filing a lawsuit not violative of public policy); Gaiardo v. Ethyl Corp., 697 F. Supp. 1377
(M.D. Pa. 1986) (finding no violation of public policy where employee claimed termination
because employee refused to fabricate quality control records for disposable diapers); Staats
v. Ohio Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 620 F. Supp. 118 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (holding no violation of public
policy for terminating an employee for associating at employer's social functions with
members of the opposite sex that were not the employee's spouse); Ferguson v. Freedom
Forge Corp., 604 F Supp. 1157 (W.D. Pa. 1985) (finding no violation of public policy for
terminating an employee for associating with an ex-officer of the employer); Paul v.
Lankenau Hosp., 543 A.2d 1148 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), aff'd, 569 A.2d 346 (Pa. 1990) (holding
no violation of public policy where an employee alleges equitable estoppel based on reliance
on the employer's promises); Geary, 319 A2d at 174 (holding no violation of public policy in
terminating an employee for complaining about the quality and safety of an employer's
product when the employee was not qualified to do so by position or training); Hennessy v.
Santiago, 708 A.2d 1269 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (holding no violation of public policy where
counselor at community living facility did not show that law imposed affirmative duty upon
mental healthcare workers to investigate); McLaughlin v. Gastrointestinal Specialists, Inc.,
696 A.2d 173 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997), reargument denied, allocaturgranted, 721 A-2d 56 (Pa.
1997) (no violation of public policy where employee alleged that she was terminated for
complaining to employer that she and co-employees were exposed to toxic chemicals
without adequate protection and ventilation); Kuzel v. Krause, 658 A.2d 856 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1995) (holding no public policy violation for laying off employees who collected workers'
compensation); Holewinski v. Childrens' Hosp. of Pittsburgh, 649 A.2d 712 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1994), allocatur denied, 659 k2d 560 (Pa. 1995) (holding no violation of public policy in
terminating employee for raising questions about the qualifications of a candidate for a
supervisory position); Rank v. Township of Annville, 641 A.2d 667 (Pa, Commw. Ct. 1994)
(holding no violation of public policy for terminating employee who was involved in
automobile accident and who was initially charged with possession of controlled substance
but who had those charges dismissed even though one is presumed innocent until proven
guilty); Krajsa v. Keypunch, Inc., 622 A-2d 355 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (holding no violation of
public policy for terminating employee for threatening to report allegedly unlawful business
practice); Jacques v. AKZO Int'l Salt, Inc., 619 A.2d 748 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (holding specific
intent to harm does not make employee's termination actionable under public policy;
termination must violate public policy as set forth in legislation, administrative regulation, or
judicial decision); Reese v. Tom Hesser Chevrolet-BMW, 604 A.2d 1072 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)
(finding no violation of public policy for terminating employee for failing to reimburse an
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A similar result of limiting employee recovery against employers
56
has occurred with employment handbooks and policies.
Pennsylvania has recognized that an employment handbook or
policy can create an enforceable employer commitment 5 7 however,
employer for business losses); Nix v. Temple Univ., 596 A.2d 1132 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991)
(holding no violation of public policy for terminating an employee where employee refuses
to approve acts that she believed to be a misappropriation of federal funds); Beach v. Burns
Int'l Sec. Serv., 593 A.2d 1285 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding 'no violation of public policy in
terminating employee for refusal to waive a jury trial); Burkholder v. Hutchinson, 589 A.2d
721 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding no violation of public policy in terminating employee for
failure by a township secretary/treasurer to prevent spouse from speaking out on public
issues); Macken v. Lord Corp., 585 A.2d 1106 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (finding evidence was
insufficient to support employee's claim that employer terminated him for filing workers'
compensation claim); Yetter v. Ward Trucking Corp., 585 A.2d 1022 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991),
appeal denied, 600 A.2d 539 (Pa. 1991) (finding no public policy was violated where
employer allegedly terminated employee with specific intent to harm employee); Booth v.
McDonnell Douglas Truck Serv., Inc., 585 A.2d 24 (Pa. Super. Ct 1991) (holding no violation
of public policy where an employee brought a Wage Payment and Collection Law claim);
Hershberger v. Jersey Shore Steel Co., 575 A.2d 944 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 589
A.2d 691 (Pa. 1990) (finding no violation of public policy for terminating an employee for
failing a drug test without using a confirming test); Hineline v. Stroudsburg Elec. Supply Co.,
Inc., 559 A.2d 566 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (finding no violation of public policy in terminating
an employee who disconnected the employer's allegedly illegal electronic surveillance system
for secretive taping of customer and employee conversations but did not contact law
enforcement authorities or fie a private complaint); McGonagle v. Union Fidelity Corp., 556
A.2d 878 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989), appeal denied, 575 A.2d 115 (Pa. 1990) (finding no violation
of public policy in terminating general counsel for refusing to approve insurance mailings
that he believed violated unspecified insurance laws of other states); Scott v. Extracorporeal,
Inc., 545 A.2d 334 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (finding no violation of public policy in terminating
an employee for assaulting a co-employee in self-defense); Mudd v. Hoffman Homes for
Youth, Inc., 543 A.2d 1092 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (finding no violation of public policy in
terminating social worker for reporting alleged drug and child abuse); Rinehimer v. Luzerne
County Community College, 539 A.2d 1298 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (finding no violation of
public policy in terminating an employee for disagreeing with employer policymakers and
disrupting administrative operations); Marsh v. Boyle, 530 A.2d 491 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)
(finding no violation of public policy in terminating employees even though employees
performed their duties properly); Martin v. Capitol Cities Media, Inc., 511 A.2d 830 (Pa. Super
Ct. 1986) (finding no violation of public policy in terminating an employee for doing business
or associating with an employer's competitor); McCartney v. Meadowview Manor, Inc., 508
A.2d 1254 (Pa Super. Ct. 1986) (finding no violation of public policy in terminating employee
for seeking employment elsewhere); Cisco v. United Parcel Service, 476 A.2d 1340 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1984) (finding no violation of public policy in refusing to rehire employee after acquittal
of criminal charges); Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 422 A.2d 611 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1980) (finding
no violation of public policy for terminating employee for not following the chain of
command in reporting violations).
56. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., Banas v. Matthews Int'l, 502 A.2d 637 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (finding that if
the employment handbook had contained, if not expressly at least by clear implication, a just
cause provision, then an employee's claim might have merit that a handbook created a
binding employer commitment); Appeal of Colban, 427 A.2d 313 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981)
(finding that an employment handbook may create an employment property right that
requires a hearing prior to termination).
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subsequent case law has not overwhelmingly supported employee
claims.5 These employer documents have only been given limited
58. See, e.g., Anderson v. Haverford College, 851 F. Supp. 179 (E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding
no just cause provision exists where an employment handbook specifies that it is not
contractual and that the employer intends nothing contained in the handbook to alter the
at-will employment relationship); Ritter v. Pepsi-Cola Operating Co. of Chesapeake and
Indianapolis, 785 F. Supp. 61 (M.D. Pa. 1992) (employment handbook was not an enforceable
contract where clear language stated it was under no circumstances a contract); Miller v.
ALCOA, 679 F. Supp. 495 (M.D. Pa. 1988), affd, 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988) (finding
employment handbook that stated that it was the employer's policy that each salaried
employee's work performance would be objectively appraised, that the primary objective of
the system was to improve job performance, and that system would also be used to make
career, training, and development decisions did not modify at-will employment relationship);
Sendi v. NCR Comten, Inc., 619 F. Supp. 1577 (E.D. Pa. 1985), affd, 800 F.2d 1138 (3d Cir.
1985) (finding employment handbook's provision that employees were required to give at
least two weeks written notice of termination did not entitle resigning sales director to
remain employed and earn commissions for at least two additional weeks where handbook
stated that notice was required to guarantee terminating employee timely receipt of final pay
check); Short v. Borough of Lawrencevlle,,696 A-2d 1158 (Pa- 1997) (finding municipality's
personnel manual containing provisions for due process in connection with employee's
termination did not give employee reasonable expectation that termination could occur only
after due process where municipality could not contract away right to summarily terminate
employees absent statutory authority); Luteran v. Loral Fairchild Corp., 688 k2d 211 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1997) (explaining where an employer unilaterally distributes an employment
handbook and reserves the right to unilaterally change its terms, the court will not find a
just cause provision even if it lists specific grounds for termination); Small v. Juniata College,
682 A.2d 350 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1996), appeal denied, 689 A.2d 235 (Pa. 1997) (holding college's
personnel manual submitted to all employees, which contained sections discussing
termination "for cause" and conflict resolution procedures, did not transform football coach's
consecutive one-year contracts into permanent employment, where the handbook was not
referenced by any of the coach's one year employment contracts); Niehaus v. Delaware
Valley Med. Ctr., 631 A.2d 1314 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993), appeal granted, 644 A.2d 735 (Pa.
1994), rev'd without opinion, 649 A.2d 433 (Pa. 1994) (holding employment handbook's
guarantee of reinstatement after a leave of absence did not constitute a binding
commitment); Rutherford v. Presbyterian-University Hosp., 612 A.2d 500 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992)
(finding that no evidence established a contractual understanding that employee would
receive benefits of termination proceeding set forth in employment handbook); Ruzicki v.
Catholic Cemeteries Ass'n, 610 A-2d 495 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that employer not
estopped from terminating employee without resorting to employment handbook's
progressive discipline system where disclaimers that preserve the at-will employment
relationship in handbooks protect the employer against claims that it is a contract); Curran
v. Children's Serv. Ctr., 578 A.2d 8 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990), appeal denied, 585 A.2d 468 (Pa.
1991) (holding employment handbook did not provide basis on which temporary employee
could reasonably believe that he could be terminated only for just cause where it permitted
termination of temporary employees during probationary period by giving notice); Scott v.
Extracorporeal, Inc., 545 A.2d 334 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1988) (holding words implying "permanent
employment" not binding employer commitment); Mudd, 543 A.2d 1092 (holding policies
embodied in employment handbook constituted neither employment agreement nor
agreement to terminate employee for just cause); DiBonventura v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,
539 A.2d 865 (Pa. 1988) (finding that a statement that any discipline or termination
procedure in the employment handbook did not bind the employer, reserving the employer's
right to use the handbook procedures or any other procedure preserved the at-will
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enforcement when a non-termination matter or provision was
involved. 59
Implied-in-fact contracts, even though recognized, ° have
generally not been widely embraced. 1 Likewise, claims based on
employment relationship); Reilly v. Stroehmann Bros. Co., 532 A.2d 1212 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1987), appeal granted, 549 A2d 137 (Pa. 1988) (finding employment handbook's arbitration
provision not binding on employer); Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 511 A.2d 830 (Pa1986) (holding employment handbook's disciplinary procedures by itself does not create a
binding employer commitment).
59. See, e.g., Matson v. Housing Auth. of City of Pittsburgh, 510 A.2d 819 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1986) (holding employee's accumulated vacation and sick leave payment policies
enforceable). But see Hamilton v. Air Jamaica, 945 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1991) (holding employer
may reserve right in employment handbook to reduce or eliminate benefits at any time);
Morosetti v. Louisiana Land Exploration, 564 A.2d 151 (Pa. 1989) (holding severance
payments unenforceable where no direct communication of the policy by the employer to
the employees could be established, but a distributed employee handbook as an inducement
for employment can be considered an offer and its acceptance an enforceable contract.
60. See, e.g., Carlson v. Arnot-Ogden Mem'l Hosp., 918 F.2d 411 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding
contract that contains a 90 day notice provision for termination is a contract for at least 90
days of employment); Marder v. Conwed Corp., 75 FR.D. 48 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (finding
additional consideration where employee assumed substantial responsililities not normally
required of a manufacturer's representative and employee was terminated before receiving
commissions); Steinberg v. 7-Up Bottling Co., 636 A.2d 677 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (finding
employer that terminated employee after one and one-half days breached agreement that
employee would be hired on a trial basis, which meant a reasonable time to perform); News
Printing Co., v. Roundy, 597 A-2d 662 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding that where employee quit
job, turned down another job, sold house, purchased new house, and was told by employer
that it would take six months to become proficient at the job, additional consideration
existed); Cashdollar v. Mercy Hospital, 595 A.2d 70 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (holding that where
employee quit a secure, high-paying job, sold house, and moved with his pregnant wife and
two year old son additional consideration existed); Scullion v. Emeco Industries, Inc., 580
A.2d 1356 (Pa, Super. Ct. 1990) (holding that where employer told employee that the job was
the last he would ever have, received generous fringe benefits including a country club
membership, refused a pay increase from his California employer as an inducement to refuse
the Pennsylvania job, sold his house in California and purchased a lot in Pennsylvania,
additional consideration existed); Schecter v. Watkins, 395 A.2d 363 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990),
appeal denied, 584 A.2d 320 (Pa. 1990) (holding contract that has a term of one year is
enforceable especially where the notice period is only expressed in terms of renewal or
non-renewal of the contract); Robertson v. Atlantic Richfield Petroleum, 537 A.2d 814 (PaSuper. Ct. 1987) (employee agreeing to undertake a particular position in exchange for an
employer reassignment promise if his job performance proved unsatisfactory at the trial
period's end provided sufficient consideration where the employee left his prior position that
enhanced his career prospects and relocated); Greene v. Oliver Reality, Inc., 526 A.2d 1192
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (holding employee working for less than union scale in exchange for an
employer's lifetime employment contract promise).
61. See, e.g., Berda v. CBS, Inc., 800 F. Supp. 1279 (W.D. Pa. 1992) (finding interviewers'
statements about job security not enforceable); Schoch v. First Fidelity Bancorp., 1989 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 5990 (E.D. Pa- 1989), affd, 912 F.2d 658 (3d Cir. 1990) (finding an oral employer
promise that an employee would be terminated only for just cause and the employer's
admission that it generally terminated only for just cause was not sufficient to allow a
reasonable employee to regard his at-will status as converted to a contractual one); Donohue
v. Custom Management Corp., 634 E Supp. 1190 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (holding statement as to the
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implied covenants of good faith and fair dealing have found little
62

support.

Despite Geary,6 and other cases6 signalling the at-will
employment doctrine's modification, the doctrine remains relatively
undisturbed in Pennsylvania. Pennsylvania's limited modification of
the doctrine can be at best described as illusory. Even though
finding that a cause of action may exist under certain
circumstances to modify the doctrine,6 5 no employee recovery6 6 has
generally occurred in the vast majority of cases litigated since
6
Geary. 1
Recently, however, the Pennsylvania Superior Court signaled its
continuation of employee benefits unenforceable); Braun v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 635 F Supp. 75
(E.D. Pa. 1986) (holding statement that an employee is guaranteed employment as long as he
performs satisfactorily is ambiguous); Stumpp v. Stroudsburg Mun. Auth., 658 A2d 333 (Pa.
1995) (finding municipal authority did not have power under law to enter into employment
agreements that contract away right of summary termination and letter from authority to
employee failed to constitute employment agreement until he retired); Rapagnani v. Judas
Co., 736 A.2d 666 (Pa, Super. Ct. 1999) (finding reference to the "run of the tour" in
paragraph describing musical director's duties in touring production of musical were far too
vague and indefinite to form a contract for a definite term to overcome at-will employment
presumption); Brozovich v. Drugo, 651 A.2d 641 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994) (finding promise to
employ for so long as employee performs satisfactorily to ambiguous to enforce); Halpin v.
LaSalle Univ., 639 k2d 37 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (holding guarantees of employment for life or
permanent employment not enforceable); Bolduc v. Board of Supervisors, 618 A2d 1188 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 625 A.2d 1195 (Pa. 1993) (holding Second Class Township
Code did not grant tenure to public employee, making township employee's one-year
employment contract void and unenforceable); Booth v. McDonnel Douglas Truck Serv., Inc.,
685 A-2d 24 (Pa Super. Ct. 1991), appeal denied, 597 A.2d 1150 (Pa- 1991) (salary expressed
over a certain time period, for example, annually, failed to establish a contract for a specific
duration); Marsh v. Boyle, 530 A.2d 491 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (finding employer's assurance
that employee would have worked for at least two years lacked sufficient definiteness to
enforce); Murphy v. Publicker Industries, 516 A-2d 47 (Pa- Super. Ct. 1986) (holding promise
of lifetime employment not enforceable); Ross v. Montour R,R., 516 A.2d 29 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1986) (promise of lifetime employment with no sufficient consideration given by employee
not enforceable); Veno v. Meredith, 515 A.2d 571 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding statement to
the employee that the supervisor and the employee will retire together not enforceable);
Richardson v. Charles Cole Mem'l Hosp., 466 A.2d 1084 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983) (holding
promise of employment as long as the employee worked satisfactorily too indefinite to
enforce); Hay v. Pittsburgh Lodge, Loyal Order of Moose, 8 A.2d 434 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1939)
(holding that a contract that specified a salary over a time period, for example, $50,000 per
year, was not an express contract for a given term).
62. See, e.g., Baker v. Lafeyette College, 504 A2d 247 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (holding
limited implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists in every contract); but see Butz
v. Hertz Corp., 554 F Supp. 1178 (E.D. Pa. 1983) (holding federal statutory or case law does
not require a general duty of fair dealing in employment situations).
63. Geary, 319 A.2d at 174.
64. See supra notes 48-53, 56-57, 60 and accompanying text.
65. See supra notes 48-53, 56-57, 60 and accompanying text.
66. See supra notes 55, 58, 61-62, and accompanying text.
67. Geary, 319 A.2d at 174; see supra notes 57, 60, 63-64, and accompanying text.
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willingness to make a more viable dent in the doctrine's armor
under Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law 68 by extending its
applicability to private sector employees. 69 This modification may
renew interest for an even broader judicial modification or a
statutory abrogation of the at-will employment doctrine.
II.

PENNSYLVANIA'S WHISTLEBLOWER LAW

Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law ("Law") has been in effect
since 1986.70 The Law was adopted to protect employees who
report a violation or suspected violation of federal, state, or local
law.71 It protects employees who participate in hearings,
investigations, legislative inquiries, or court actions. 72 Nothing in
the Law, however, specifically states that it is to apply only to
public sector employees and not also to private sector employees
when the right set of circumstances exist. 73
68. Whistleblower Law, Pk STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1421-1428 (West 1991).
69. See, e.g., Riggio v. Burns, 711 k2d 497 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (en banc), appeal
dismissed, 739 A2d 161 (Pa. 1999); see also Denton v. Silver Stream Nursing and
Rehabilitation Ctr, 739 k2d 571 (Pa. Super. 1999).
70. PA- STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1421-1428 (West 1991).
71. PA- STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1421 (West 1991) (see Historical and Statutory Notes
accompanying section).
72. Id. § 1421.
73. Prior to the Pennsylvania Superior Court's 1998 decision in Riggio v. Burns, 711
A.2d 497 (Pa Super. Ct. 1998) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 739 A.2d A.2d 161 (Pa. 1999)
(holding private sector employer may be agent of a public body extending Whistleblower
Law's protections) and its 1999 decision in Denton v. Silver Stream Nursing and
Rehabilitation Center, 739 A-2d 571 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999) (fmding receipt by private sector
employer of Medicaid funding is sufficient to qualify as a "public body" for purposes of
Whistleblower Law, which defines employer as an agent of a public body), the Law was
thought to apply only to public sector employees. See Gallant v. BOC Group, Inc., 886 F
Supp. 202 (D. Mass. 1995) (holding that by its own terms, scope of Pennsylvania's
Whistleblower Law is limited to employees terminated from governmental entities or any
other "public body" which is created or funded by the government; former employee of
private, for profit company could not maintain claim against company because company was
a private corporation and was not funded in any way by the government); Clark v. Modem
Group Ltd., 9 F3d 321 (3d Cir. 1993) (rehearing and rehearing in banc denied) (holding under
Pennsylvania Law, Whistleblower Law is not indicator of public policy in private termination
cases; there is no general public policy of protecting whistleblowers who are not employed
in the public sector); Johnson v. Resources for Human Development, Inc., 843 F Supp. 974
(E.D. Pa. 1994) (holding Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law applies only to public employees
who in good faith report about instances of wrongdoing or waste to employer or appropriate
authority); Cohen v. Salick Health Care, Inc., 772 F Supp. 1521 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (holding that
Medicaid reimbursement receipt by private corporation, which was in business of operating
and managing hospital-based out-patient cancer treatment centers throughout nation, was
insufficient to bring corporation within "public body's" definition under Pennsylvania
Whistleblower Law; it was not Pennsylvania legislature's intention to include doctors and
other health care providers as funded public bodies under the Law); Wagner v. General Elec.
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Under the Law, an employer may not "discharge, threaten or
otherwise discriminate or retaliate against an employee" who
reports (or is about to report) a suspected violation of federal,
state, or local law.74 The employer cannot adversely affect the
"employee's compensation, terms, conditions, location or privileges
of employment because the employee or a person acting on behalf
of the employee makes a good faith report or is about to report,
verbally or in writing, to the employer or appropriate authority an
instance of wrongdoing or waste."7 5 A good faith report is
considered a "report of conduct [concerning] wrongdoing or waste
which is made without malice or consideration of personal benefit
and which the person making the report has reasonable cause to
believe is true."7 6 A violation also results where an employee is
Co., 760 F Supp. 1146 (E.D. Pa. 1991) (finding that Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law would
not support wrongful termination action by at-will employee allegedly terminated in reprisal
for making critical and derogatory analysis of employer's products to customer, scope of
Law was limited to public or quasi-public employees); Holewinsld v. Children's Hosp. of
Pittsburgh, 649 A.2d 712 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994), appeal denied, 659 A.2d 560 (Pa. 1994)
(holding that the Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law applies only to employees terminated
from governmental entities and, thus did not protect private sector hospital employee from
termination allegedly due to her whistleblowing conduct); Krajsa v. Keypunch, Inc., 622 A.2d
355 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993) (Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law did not apply to private
company's at-will employee's wrongful termination claim that performed government
contracts; scope of law was limited to employees terminated from governmental entities or
other entities created or funded by government).
74. PA.STAT. ANN.tit. 43, § 1423(a) (West 1991).
75. Id.; see, e.g., Golaschevsky v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Envtl. Resources, 683 A.2d
1299 (Pa- Commw. Ct. 1996), affd, 720 A.2d 757 (Pa. 1998) (public employee failed to show
causal connection between his statement to employer that he suspected violations of
copyright law in office and his subsequent termination four months later to support
Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law's violation; inference of causal connection could not be
made solely through passage of time); Rodgers v. Pennsylvania Dept. of Corrections, 659
A.2d 63 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995) (corrections officer stated claim against Department of
Corrections and its officials under Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law, notwithstanding
contention that is was unclear whether some of matters reported and adverse treatment
received fell under Law's provisions; officer alleged that he reported irregularities at facility
at which he worked, including unnecessary funds' expenditure, employee's termination for
no apparent reason, requests to change evaluation and alter reports, and use of inmates for
personal reasons; that after making reports, his shift was changed, his duties were reduced,
he was chastised for reports, and he was eventually forced to choose between remaining at
facility and being subject to harassment or transfer and demotion); Spiropoulos v.
Unemployment Compensation Bd. of Review, 654 A.2d 642 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1995) (prison
employee's release of confidential documents was not protected under Pennsylvania's
Whistleblower Law, so that his willful misconduct in violating prison rule by releasing
documents was not justified and he was ineligible for unemployment compensation; Law
protects only communications or testimony before governmental agencies, and employee
released information to private advocacy group).
76. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1422 (West 1991). See, e.g., Golaschevsky v. Commonwealth,
Dept. of Enviti Protection, 683 A.2d 1299 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996), affd, 720 A_2d 757 (Pa.
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adversely affected by his/her employer when requested by an
appropriate authority to participate in an investigation, hearing, or
77
inquiry held by an appropriate authority or in a court action.
Wrongdoing is a "violation which is not of a merely technical or
minimal nature."78 It must concern a federal or state statute or
regulation, a political subdivision's ordinance or regulation, or a
code of conduct or ethics designed to protect the public's or the
9
employer's interest.7
1998) (public employee failed to establish that he made good faith report of wrongdoing to
his employer as would support Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law's violation arising out of his
statement to employer that he suspected violations of copyright law through computer users
in office where supervisor encouraged employee to submit list of alleged illegal computer
uses and although employee was in position to substantiate illegal computer use by various
means, he failed to produce evidence of any alleged illegal computer use); Lutz v.
Springettsbury Township, 667 A.2d 251 (Pa. Comrnw. Ct. 1995) (reargument denied) (for
purposes of action under Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law, "good faith report" is generally
one initiated by employee based upon that employee's suspicion of wrongdoing or waste;
allegations of former township director of wastewater treatment that he conducted
investigation, at township's request, into deficit resulting from undercharging of other
municipalities for use of township's treatment facility, that he submitted report on
investigation to township, that township declined to follow his recommendations regarding
deficit and that he was terminated months later did not set forth viable claim under the Law,
even assuming report directed by township was a good faith report within the Law's
meaning; former director failed to demonstrate any connection between his termination and
either the report or investigation); Gray v. Hafer, 651 A.2d 221 (Pa- Conunw. Ct 1994), affd,
669 A.2d 335 (Pa- 1994) (former employee of Department of Auditor General failed to state
claim for violation of Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law, employee alleged only that he filed
report of wrongdoing and waste, that Auditor General did not respond until four months
later when one of the report's subjects requested copy of report, and that, only then, was he
terminated, employee did not allege specifics of wrongdoing, and employee did not show by
concrete facts or surrounding circumstances that report led to his termination; however,
employee would be given leave to amend his petition to state claim for violation of Law).
77. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1423(b) (West 1991). See, e.g., Freeman v. McKellar, 795 F.
Supp. 733 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (on motion to dismiss claim under Pennsylvania's Whistleblower
Law by city employee who was terminated for admitting to city property's theft after he
testified before grand jury that he had remodeled department head's home on city time with
materials that were property of city as he was ordered to do by department head, defense
that employee was removed for legitimate reasons could not be sustained; although it might
be inferred that employee knowingly participated in scheme to misappropriate and misuse
public property and fact that he did so at supervisor's behest would not immunize him from
wrongdoing charge, it could reasonably be inferred that employer's motives were retaliatory
and that employee was removed for testifying).
78. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1422 (West 1991).
79. Id.; see, e.g., Rankin v. City of Philadelphia, 963 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(employee adequately alleged "wrongdoing" for purposes of motion to dismiss claim under
Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law, where he alleged nursing home that contracted with city
was in substantial violation of numerous health and safety requirements; under Law
violations need not be concealed to constitute "wrongdoing"); Podgurski v. Pennsylvania
State Univ, 722 A.2d 730 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (staff assistant at state university who was
disciplined for making complaints stated claim under Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law;
complaints that assistant lodged against her coemployees included expenditures of
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Waste is an "employer's conduct or omissions which result in
substantial abuse, misuse, destruction or loss of funds or resources
belonging to or derived from Commonwealth [of Pennsylvania] or
80
political subdivision sources."
An appropriate authority for reporting wrongdoing or waste is
considered to be a "[flederal, [s]tate or local government body,
agency or organization having jurisdiction over criminal law
enforcement, regulatory violations, professional conduct or ethics,
or waste."8' It is also a "member, officer, agent, representative or
supervisory employee of the body, agency or organization."8 2 "The
term includes, but is not limited to, the Office of the Attorney
General, the Department of the Auditor General, the Treasury
Department, the General Assembly and committees of the General
Assembly having the power and duty to investigate criminal law
unnecessary funds, dismissal of employees absent any reason, hiring of employees absent
proper qualification, false reporting of hours worked, and improper conduct by coemployees
while at work; i.e, babysitting children, and this conduct, if proven, fell within Law's
definition of "wrongdoing"); Golaschevsky v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Envtl Protection, 683
A.2d 1299 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1996), aff'd, 720 A.2d 757 (Pa. 1998) (where public employee
alleges that there has been illegal activity within his own agency, term "wrongdoing," as used
in Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law, includes not only violations of statutes or regulations
that are of the type that the employer is charged to enforce, but violations of any federal or
state statute or regulation, other than violations that are merely technical or of minimal
nature); Gray v. Hafer, 651 A.2d 221 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1994), affid, 669 A.2d 335 (Pa. 1994)
(to fall within definition of "wrongdoing" under Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law, violation
reported by public employee must be violation of statute or regulation of type that employer
is charged to enforce for good of public body or one dealing with employer's internal
administration). But see Connor v. Clinton County Prison, 963 F Supp. 442 (M.D. Pa. 1997)
(former county prison employee's allegations that she was terminated for documenting that
prison warden had violated prison's internal policies requiring paperwork before release of
inmate was not "report of wrongdoing" that implicated Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law;
employee's private log did not constitute report and internal policy's violation was not
covered by Law); Hays v. Beverly Enters., Inc., 766 F Supp. 350 (WD. Pa 1991), aff'd, 952
F2d 1392 (3d Cir. 1991) (licensed practical nurse's report to her supervisor concerning
medical condition and treatment of personal boarding facility resident did not concern
"wrongdoing" as contemplated by Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law and, Law did not
provide nurse with cause of action for wrongful termination; regulation relied upon by nurse
to establish facility's wrongdoing placed no duty upon facility to prescribe treatment for
resident or to transfer her to health care facility); Riggio v. Burns, 711 A.2d 497 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1998) (en banc), appeal dismissed, 739 A.2d 161 (Pa. 1999) (neurologist's objections that
supervising surgeon at medical institution was not physically present while residents placed
depth electrodes in or over epilepsy patients' brains did not qualify as report of
"wrongdoing" under Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law; licensing statutes were of no
assistance to neurologist because they lacked specificity as to what acts were proscribed;
"wrongdoing" does not encompass tort principles unless statute, regulation, or code of
conduct or ethics is violated by tortious act or omission).
80. PA STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1422 (West 1991).
81. Id.
82. Id.
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enforcement, regulatory violations, professional conduct or ethics,
or waste."83
To be protected under the Law, an employee must be employed
by an employer subject to the Law's provisions. The Law defines an
employee as any "person who performs a service for wages or
other remuneration under a contract of hire, written or oral,
express or implied, for a public body." 81
More complicated, however, is determining who an employer is.
An employer is: (1) a "person supervising one or more employees,
including the employee in question;" (2) "a superior of that
supervisor;" or (3) "an agent of a public body."s5
83. Id.
84. Id.; see, e.g., Rankin, 963 F Supp. at 463 (under Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law,
nursing home employee was "employee" of city with which nursing home contracted for
purposes of Law, as he was performing services for city as employee of city's agent;
"employee" must be interpreted to require only that person perform services for public
body,
even if that person's actual contract of hire is with nonpublic body agent; privity of contract
is not required).
85. See PA- STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1422 (West 1991). For court decisions considering
'employer" to mean a private or public sector employer, see, e.g., Rankin, 963 F Supp. at
463 (under Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law, city employees were "employers," as they
were employed by city; any person who is an "agent of a public body" is an "employer");
Riggio, 711 A.2d at 497, appeal dismissed, 739 A.2d 161 (Pa. 1999) (private sector employer
may be agent of a public body extending Whistleblower Law's protections); Denton, 739 A.2d
at 571 (receipt by private sector employer of Medicaid funding is sufficient to qualify as a
"public body" for purposes of Whistleblower Law, which defines employer as an agent
of a
public body); Rodgers, 659 A.2d at 63 (superintendent of correctional institution at which
corrections officer was employed and Commissioner of Department of Corrections came
within definition of "employer" for purposes of the Law). For decisions that do not consider
"employer" to include a private sector employer, see Gallant, 886 F Supp. at 202 (by its own
terms, Pennsylvania Whistleblower Laws scope is limited to employees terminated from
governmental entities or any other "public body" which is created or funded by the
government; former employee of private, for profit company could not maintain claim
against company because company was a private corporation and was not funded in any
way by the government); Clark, 9 F3d at 321 (rehearing and rehearing en banc denied)
(under Pennsylvania Law, Whistleblower Law is not indicator of public policy in private
termination cases; there is no general public policy of protecting whistleblowers who are not
employed in the public sector); Johnson, 843 F Supp. at 974 (Pennsylvania Whistleblower
Law applies only to public employees who good faith report about instances of wrongdoing
or waste to employer or appropriate authority); Cohen, 772 F Supp. at 1521 (on
reconsideration) (private, for-profit corporation, which was in business of operating and
managing hospital-based out-patient cancer treatment centers throughout nation, did not
come within Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law's "employer" definition on ground of its
relationship with Commonwealth funded university, relationship between parties and
management agreement was specifically characterized as that of independent contractor and
not partners or joint venture); Holewinski, 649 A.2d at 712, appeal denied, 659 A.2d 560 (Pa.
1994) (Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law applies only to employees terminated from
governmental entities and, did not protect private sector hospital employee from termination
allegedly due to her whistleblowing conduct); Krajsa, 622 Ak2d at 355 (Pennsylvania
Whistleblower Law did not apply to an at-will employee's termination from a company that
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A public body is defined as all of the following:
(1) A State officer, agency, department, division, bureau,
board, commission, council, authority, or other body in the
executive branch of State government.
(2) A county, city, township, regional governing body, council,
school district, special district or municipal corporation, or a
board, department, commission, council or agency.
(3) Any other body which is created by the Commonwealth
[of Pennsylvania] or political subdivision authority or which is
funded in any amount by or through [the] Commonwealth or
political subdivision authority or a member or employee of
86
that body.
To recover under the Law, an
employee alleging a violation . .
must show by a
preponderance of the evidence that, prior to the alleged
[employer adverse action], the employee or a person acting on
the employee's behalf had reported or was about to report in
good faith, verbally or in writing, an instance of wrongdoing or
87
waste to the employer or an appropriate authority.
performed government contracts; scope of law was limited to employees terminated from
governmental entities or other entities created or funded by government).
86. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1422 (West 1991). See, e.g., Rankin, 963 F. Supp, at 463
(public body may be held liable for Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law's violation); Riggio, 711
A.2d at 497, appeal dismissed, 739 A.2d 161 (Pa. 1999) (private medical institution that
received some funding from state was "public body" for purposes of Pennsylvania's
Whistleblower Law).
87. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1424(b) (West 1991). See, e.g., Golaschevsky, 683 A.2d at
1299 aff'd, 720 A.2d 757 (Pa. 1998) (public employee failed to establish that he made good
faith report of wrongdoing to his employer as would support Pennsylvania Whistleblower
Law's violation arising out of his statement to employer that he suspected violations of
copyright law through computer users in officer where supervisor encouraged employee to
submit list of alleged illegal computer uses and although employee was in position to
substantiate illegal -computer use by various means, he failed to produce evidence of any
alleged illegal computer use); Lutz v. Springettsbury Township, 667 A2d 251 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1995) (reargument denied) (for purposes of action under Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law,
"good faith report" is generally one initiated by employee based upon that employee's
suspicion of wrongdoing or waste; allegations of former township director of wastewater
treatment that he conducted investigation, at township's request, into deficit resulting from
undercharging of other municipalities for use of township's treatment facility, that he
submitted report on investigation to township, that township declined to follow his
recommendations regarding deficit and that he was terminated months later did not establish
claim under the Law, even assuming report directed by township was a good faith report
within meaning of Law; former director failed to demonstrate any connection between his
termination and either the report or investigation); Gray, 651 A-2d at 221, affd, 669 k2d at
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The person alleging a violation must "bring a civil action in a court
of competent jurisdiction for appropriate injunctive relief or
damages, or both, within 180 days after the occurrence of the
alleged violation."88 The employer can defend its actions by
showing "by a preponderance of the evidence that the action by the
employer occurred for separate and legitimate reasons, which are
not merely pretextual." 9 However, the right to a jury trial does not
existf 0

A court has considerable latitude in awarding remedies for the
Law's violation. The court can order the employee's reinstatement,
backpay, restoration of fringe benefits and seniority rights, actual
damages, or any combination of these remedies.9 '
The complainant may be awarded all or a portion of the
litigation's cost, including reasonable attorney fees and witness
335 (1994) (former employee of Department of Auditor General failed to state claim for
violation of Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law; employee alleged only that he filed report of
wrongdoing and waste, that Auditor General did not respond until four months later when
one of subjects of report requested copy of report, and that, only then, was he terminated;
employee did not allege specifics of wrongdoing, and employee did not show by concrete
facts or surrounding circumstances that report led to his termination; however, employee
would be given leave to amend his petition to state claim for violation of Law).
88. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1424(a) (West 1991). See, e.g., O'Rourke v. Pennsylvania
Department of Corrections, 730 A.2d 1039 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999) (under Pennsylvania's
Whistleblower Law, an action must be filed within 180 days of the alleged violation, and this
180 day time limit is mandatory; courts have no discretion to extend it and claims arising
from any alleged acts of retaliation that occurred more than 180 days prior to date that
employee filed Whistleblower Law complaint were time-barred); Perry v. Tioga County, 649
A.2d 186 (Pa. Comnw. Ct. 1994), appeal denied, 655 A.2d 995 (1995) (public employee's
Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law claim was time barred, where it was not brought within 180
days of adverse personnel action).
•89. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1424(c) (West 1991). See, e.g., Freeman v. McKellar, 795
F. Supp. 733 (E.D. Pa. 1992) (on motion to dismiss claim under Pennsylvania's Whistleblower
Law by city employee who was terminated for admitting to city property's theft after he
testified before grand jury that he had remodeled department head's home on city time with
materials that were city's property as he was ordered to do by department head, defense that
employee was removed for legitimate reasons could not be sustained; although it might be
inferred that employee knowingly participated in scheme to misappropriate and misuse
public property and fact that he did so at supervisor's behest would not immunize him from
wrongdoing charge, it could reasonably be inferred that employer's motives were retaliatory
and that employee was removed for testifying).
90. See, e.g., Williams v. Borough of Braddock, 28 Pa. D. & C.4th 211 (1996) (there
being no provision for a jury trial in Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law, and there having
been no common-law action for wrongful termination when Pennsylvania's Constitution was
enacted, the court determined that plaintiff had no right to a jury trial); Clark v. Lancaster
City Hous. Auth., 14 Pa. D. & C.4th 411 (1992) (a litigant seeking damages for violation of
Pennsylvania's Whistleblower Law does not have a right to a jury trial).
91. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1425 (West 1991).
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fees.2 These latter remedies may also be available to an
unsuccessful employee. The Law does not indicate that the
complainant need to be successful for the award.93 It only uses the
word "complainant."94 However, punitive damages may not be
5
available.
A person who violates the Law may be subject to certain
7
penalties.9 6 A civil fine of not more than $500.00 may be levied.
Additionally, except where a person holds elective office, the court
may suspend a person for up to six months from public service
who is employed by the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or a
98
political subdivision.
To notify employees of the Law, an employer is required to "post
notices and use other appropriate means to notify employees and
keep them informed of [the Law's] protections and obligations. 99
III.

PENNSYLVANIA'S WHISTLEBLOWER LAW'S EXTENSION TO PRIVATE
SECTOR EMPLOYEES

Prior to 1998, it was generally thought that Pennsylvania's
Whistleblower Law was enacted to statutorily protect only public
employees from employer retaliation when those employees made
good faith efforts to alert appropriate authorities to governmental
wrongdoing or waste. 1°° However, in Riggio v. Burns,1 1 the
Pennsylvania Superior Court, sitting en banc, extended the Law's
protections to the private sector where it could be shown that the
private sector employer received public monies and acted as a
public body's agent. This position was followed by the superior
court's 1999 decision in Denton v. Silver Stream Nursing and
02
RehabilitationCenter.
As noted above, the Law provides that "[n]o employer may
92. Id.
93. Id. For example, this may be similar to a complainant's recovery that is
permissible under the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII). See, e.g., Norris v. Sysco Corp., 191
E3d 1043 (9th Cir. 1999) (an employer's failure to obtain tangible relief in a Title VII
mixed-motive action did not preclude an award of attorneys' fees in favor of the employee).
94. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1425 (West 1991).
95. Rankin, 963 F Supp. at 463 (holding that punitive damages. are not available
under Pennsylvania Whistleblower Law).
96. PA- STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1425 (West 1991).
97. Id. at § 1425.
98. Id.
99. Id. at § 1428.
100. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
101. Riggio, 711 A.2d at 497.
102. 739 A.2d 571 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
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discharge, threaten or otherwise discriminate or retaliate against an
employee... because the employee... makes a good faith report
or is about to report, verbally or in writing, to the employer or
10 3
appropriate authority an instance of wrongdoing or waste."
"Employee" is defined as "[a] person who performs a service for
wages or other remuneration under a contract of hire . . . for a
public body."104
Because the Law applies only to an employee of a public body,
the superior court in Riggio reasoned that it must first determine
whether a private sector employer may be considered a "public
body."105 The Law defines "public body," in relevant part, as "[a]ny
...body which is created by the Commonwealth [of Pennsylvania]
or political subdivision authority or which is funded in any
amount by or through Commonwealth or political subdivision
authority or a member or employee of that body."106
In Riggio, the Medical College of Pennsylvania ("College")
admitted in response to interrogatories to receiving yearly
appropriations from the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 107
Nevertheless, the College maintained that these appropriations
could not make it a public body for the Law's purposes. The
College argued that finding it to be a public body would be an
108
absurd result, which the legislature did not intend.
To support this argument, the College pointed to the ambiguity in
the legislature's use of the term "funded," which the Law did not
define. It relied upon Cohen v. Salick Health Care, Inc.' °0 In Cohen,
the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania wrote after commenting that "[iut is clear that the
legislative intent was to make the law applicable to bodies that
receive even one dollar of state funding," but that the Law's
legislative history was silent as to what was meant by "funded." 110
In reviewing Cohen,' the superior court examined whether
Salick Health Care, Inc. was funded by or through the
Commonwealth. Salick Health Care was a California, public for
profit corporation, which was involved in a contractual relationship
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

PA STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1423(a) (West 1991).
Id. at § 1422.
Riggio, 711 A.2d at 499.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1422 (West 1991) (emphasis added).
Riggio, 711 A.2d at 499.
Id. at 500.
Cohen, 772 F Supp. at 1527.
Id. at 1526.
Id. at 1521.
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with Temple University regarding the operation of a cancer
treatment center in Philadelphia. The center treated
Medicaid-eligible patients and billed the Commonwealth through
Temple University. The Medicaid reimbursement was then remitted
to Temple, which in turn paid Salick Health Care an amount
112
representing payment for services rendered.
The federal court in Cohen held that this arrangement did not
constitute funding by or through Commonwealth authority, and that
113
Salick Health Care was not a public body under the Law.
However, the superior court in response to this holding wrote that
even if it were bound by a federal court's decision interpreting a
Pennsylvania statute, which it was not, the issue of whether
Medicaid reimbursements constituted funding was not before the
Court.1 4 In Riggio, the College had acknowledged that it received
5
specific appropriations from the Pennsylvania General Assembly."
A more direct form of funding was difficult to envision to bring the
College within the Law's coverage.
The College claimed that finding it to be a public body simply
because it received state appropriations would be an absurd
result. 116 It would "warp the plain meaning of the term 'public
body' " to include all otherwise private entities that receive state
appropriations." 7 Consequently, thousands of these private entities
would unexpectedly be subject to the Law. In response, the
Superior Court found that the term "public body" was expressly
defined by the legislature for the Law's purposes. 1 8 Where a statute
provides internal definitions, the Court is bound to construe the
statute according to those definitions. 1 9
The Law plainly and unequivocally makes any body "funded in
any manner by or through Commonwealth ... authority" a public
body. 2 ° Where a statute's language is unambiguous on its face, the
court must give effect to that language. Parenthetically, the
superior court noted that it was not unreasonable for the
legislature to condition state funds' receipt on the acceptance of
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
Super. Ct.
120.

Riggio, 711 A.2d at 500.
Cohen, 772 F Supp. 1521.
Riggio, 711 A.2d at 500.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Riggio, 711 A.2d at 500 (quoting Hodges v. Rodriguez, 645 A.2d 1340, 1348 (Pa1994) (citing 1 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 1903(a))).
Riggio, 711 A.2d at 500.
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the responsibilities embodied in the Law.121
Accordingly, the superior court found that the College was
clearly funded by the Commonwealth and the Law applied to the
private sector doctor as a public body's employee. 2 2 However, the
court went on to find that the doctor did not establish a
123
wrongdoing under the Law to permit recovery.
The Pennsylvania Superior Court subsequently, in Denton v.
Silver Stream Nursing and Rehabilitation Center,12 4 followed
Riggio 25 that a private sector employer could be subject to the
Law. In Denton, the court found that the Law made it clear that it
was intended to apply to all agencies that received public monies
under the Commonwealth's administration. 2 6
For example, legislatively appropriated funds are not the only
monies that will create a "public body" status under the Law. The
statutory language differentiates between appropriated and
"pass-through" funds and extends the Law to cover both types; i.e.,
"[a]ny other body which is... funded in any amount by or through
Commonwealth ...authority."12 7 The Law clearly indicates that it is
intended to be applied to bodies that receive not only money
appropriated by the Commonwealth, but also public money that
28
passes through the Commonwealth from the federal government.
Contrary to Cohen,12 9 the superior court went on to find that the
receipt of Medicaid funding by a private sector employer fell within
the Law's "public body" definition.10 Unlike Riggio, 3' the court
found sufficient facts for the employee to maintain a cause of
3
action under the Law.
Based on these recent superior court decisions,'1' the Law's
coverage has been extended to encompass any private entity that
qualifies as a public body. Obvious private sector employer
examples are hospitals, nursing and retirement homes, institutions
for the mentally retarded, institutions for the mentally ill, home
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 501-503.
739 A.2d 571 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1999).
Riggio, 711 A.2d at 497.
Denton, 739 A.2d at 576.
Id. at 576 (emphasis added).
Id.
Cohen, 772 F. Supp. 1521.
Denton, 739 A2d at 576.
Riggio, 711 A.2d at 497.
Denton, 739 A.2d at 576-578.
Denton, 739 A.2d at 571; Riggio, 711 A.2d at 497.
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health care providers, physicians, chiropractors, podiatrists,
ambulance companies, dentists, optometrists, etc. All of the
aforementioned generally receive some form of public funding.
An employee who works for any other private sector employer,
contractor, or person who does business with a public body is also
not precluded from claiming the Law's coverage by these
decisions. 134 Examples of these private sector employers are
contractors that perform public works projects, those making sales
to public bodies, or anyone entering into any contract with a public
body to provide services, including legal, consulting, computer,
engineering, etc.
These decisions may have judicially modified the Law to its
broadest extent possible by statutorily abrogating part of the at-will
employment doctrine. 135 The Law may now protect almost every
private and public sector employee who seeks to bring a cause of
action for a public policy whistleblowing violation.
IV.

A.

STATUTORY MODIFICATION OF AT-WILL EMPLOYMENT

Why Protect At-Will Employees Statutorily?

As the new millennium dawns, it is time to re-examine the need
to statutorily protect at-will employees against not just wrongful
terminations but against all types of adverse employment actions.
Work is much different today than it was one hundred, fifty, or
even twenty-five years ago. It will change even more rapidly as new
technology is introduced into the workplace during the next ten
years. The law must evolve to meet these workplace changes and
136
challenges as it has in the past.
The vast majority of us depend upon our employer for wages and
benefits to cope with and meet life's basic daily responsibilities of
providing food, clothing, and shelter. Historical developments
during the past century confirm that federal and state statutes have
recognized that a concept of fundamental fairness is ingrained in
today's employment relations to protect certain adverse employer
actions. 37 Based on these economic developments, a persuasive
argument can no longer be made why at-will employees should not
have the right to contest their employers over any adverse action.
134.
135.
136.
137.

Denton, 739 A.2d at 571; Riggio, 711 A-2d at 497.
Denton, 739 A.2d at 571; Riggio, 711 A-2d at 497.
See, e.g., supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., supra note 32 and accompanying text.
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Employers must be held more accountable and responsible to
society for their adverse actions where these actions are arbitrary,
capricious, or discriminatory.
1 38
At least two million at-will employees are terminated each year.
It can only be speculated how many at-will employees are subject
to other employer adverse employment actions involving
reprimands, suspensions without pay, demotions, etc.
Many of these adverse employment actions may not be justified
by a nonarbitrary, noncapricious, or nondiscriminatory reason that
would meet the "just cause" standard for these actions under
collective bargaining agreements that protect union represented
employees. 39 The human tragedy in permitting these wrongful
138.

ST. ANTOINE, MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT,

supra note 6, at 270.

139. Most collective bargaining agreements in the private and public sectors do, in fact,
require some form of "cause" or "just cause" for an employee's termination or other adverse
employment action. Where this is not contained in a collective bargaining agreement, many
arbitrators imply a "just cause" limitation. For instance, Arbitrator Walter E. Boles held that
a "just cause" standard for consideration of disciplinary action is, absent or clear proviso to
the contrary, implied in a collective bargaining agreement. See Cameron Iron Works, Inc., 25
Lab. Arb. (BNA) 295, 301 (1955) (Boles, Arb.). The reason is:
If the Cmpany can discharge without cause, it can lay off without cause. It can
recall, transfer, or promote in violation of the seniority provisions simply in invoking
its claimed right to discharge. Thus, to interpret the Agreement in accord with the
claim of the Company would reduce to a nullity the fundamental provision of a
labor-management agreement - the security of a worker in his job.
Atwater Mfg. Co., 13 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 747, 749 (1949). The general significance of the terms
"cause" or "just cause" were discussed by Arbitrator Joseph McGoldrick as follows:
[I]t is common to include the right to suspend and discharge for "just cause,"
"justifiable cause," "proper cause," "obvious cause," or quite commonly for "cause."
There is no significant difference between these various phrases. These exclude
discharge for things for which employees have been traditionally fired. They include
the traditional causes of discharge in the particular trade or industry, the practices
which develop in the day-to-day relations of management and labor and most recently
they include the decisions of courts and arbitrators. They represent a growing body of
"common law" that may be regarded either as the latest development of the law of
"master and servant" or perhaps, more properly as part of the new body of common
law of "Management and labor under collective bargaining agreements." They
constitute the duties owed by employees to management and, in their correlative
aspect, are part of the rights of management. They include such duties as honesty,
punctuality, sobriety, or, conversely, the right to discharge for theft, repeated absence
or lateness, destruction of company property, brawling and the like. Where they are
not expressed in posted rules, they may very well be implied, provided they are
applied in a uniform, non-discriminatory manner.
Worthington Corp., 24 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1, 6-7 (1955) (McGoldrick, Arb.).
Few, if any, collective bargaining agreements define "cause" or "just cause." A
seven-question checklist to determine "cause" or "just cause" was developed by Arbitrator
Carroll R. Daugherty in Whirlpool Corp., 58 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 421 (1972) (Daugherty, Arb.).
This checklist sets forth the following:
(1) Did the employer forewarn the employee orally or in writing of the possible or
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adverse employment actions is immeasurable. 40
Today, more than ever, each of us identifies ourself and finds
value in one's self through our employment. We introduce ourselves
as teachers, laborers, carpenters, engineers, bricklayers, steelworkers, etc. 41 Being gainfully employed is more than a means of
142
earning a living. It is essential to our very "existence and dignity."
probable consequences of the employee's adverse action?
(2) Was the employer's rule reasonably related to the orderly, efficient, and safe
operation of the business and the performance that the employer might reasonably
expect of the employee?
(3) Did the employer, before administering discipline to the employee, make an effort
to discover whether the employee did in fact violate or disobey an employer rule or
order?
(4) Was the employer's investigation conducted fairly and objectively?
(5) At the employer's investigation, did the employer's adjudicator obtain substantial
and compelling evidence or proof that the employee was responsible or at fault as
alleged?
(6) Has the employer applied its rule, orders, policies, and penalties fairly and without
discrimination to all employees?
(7) Was the degree of discipline reasonably related to the seriousness of the offense
and the employee's work performance record with the employer?
Whirlpool Corp., 58 Lab. Arb. (BNA) at 421. A negative response to any question on this
checklist would overturn the employer's disciplinary action.
Another analysis of "just cause" starts by focusing on the shared interests of management
and labor.
Management can have little objection to a fair and consistent system of discipline.
Similarly, a union has no cause to object to disciplinary actions occasioned by
employee conduct that significantly interferes with management's legitimate concern
for production. Although the parties may differ as to whether a particular disciplinary
action is fair or whether a given type of behavior warrants a certain measure of
discipline, they can agree that the legitimate interests of management and labor
provide the standards against which management's action must be judged. In order to
establish just cause for disciplinary action, management must first show that its
interests were significantly affected by the employee's conduct. Alternatively,
management may show that even though the employee is unlikely to repeat the
wrongful conduct, it is important to deter other employees from such conduct and
that discharge is the only effective form of deterrence. Either of these two
explanations would establish a prima facie showing of just cause. In order to rebut
this showing of just cause, a union must prove that management failed to give the
employee industrial due process or industrial equal protection, or failed to consider
mitigating factors. For example, the union may show that management took
disciplinary action without adequate investigation, or singled out the employee for
discipline when others had been excused for the same conduct, or ignored mitigating
circumstances such as illness or provocation.
ABRAMs & NoLAN, supra note 6, at 610-12.
140. SPRANG, supra note 6, at 852.
141. Id.
142. Gould, The Idea of the Job as Propertyin ContemporaryAmerica: The Legal and
Collective Bargaining Framework, 1986 B.YU. L REV. 885, 892 (1986). Professor Gould
further observed:
One's job provides not only income essential to the acquisition of the necessities of
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It is not surprising that many employees suffer emotional trauma

when they subjected to employer adverse actions.1 3 That distress
frequently affects relationships with families and friends.'"
Employers also suffer.1 4 Wrongful adverse employment actions
do not make good economic sense. Employee moral is negatively
affected by the observation of unjust employer actions. Employees
wonder whether their own positions are at risk. Consequently,
productivity, loyalty, and employee attitudes may suffer.46 This may.
also give rise for the employees to seek security and protection by
47
joining a union.'
During the past century, piecemeal federal and state statutes
have recognized employees' rights to challenge adverse employer
actions arising out of organizing and forming a union, health and
safety matters, and discriminatory conduct.' 48 Yet, the most basic
aspect of the employment relationship; i.e., to be free altogether
from arbitrary, capricious, and discriminatory actions of one's
employer, has been left virtually untouched.
Courts are neither equipped to handle the additional caseload nor
sufficiently experienced in the area of daily employment relations
life, but also the opportunity to shape the aspirations of one's family, aspirations.
which are both moral and educational. Along with marital relations and religion, it is
hard to think of what might be viewed as more vital in our society than the
opportunity to work and retain one's employment status.
Id.; see also Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights: A Changing Concept of
Employment At Will, 17 An Bus. U. 467, 481 n.64 (1980) [hereinafter BLACKBURN] ("The
question of job security is the most important factor in the life of worker.").
143. See BLADES, supra note 6, at 1413 (observing that social stigma and mental
anguish are normal consequences of being terminated).
144. See SPRANG, supra note 6, at 852-853. The consequences of employment
termination have been described as follows:
The societal costs of maintaining the terminable at will practice may manifest
themselves in a variety of ways. Even assuming that an employer may immediately
find a substitute for a wrongfully discharged employee, the discharged employee will
usually qualify for governmentally distributed unemployment insurance. If the
discharged employee fails to find suitable employment, he or she may become a
public charge or even lead a life of crime. On a more personal level, the mental and
social consequences to the discharged employee and the immediate family may be as
severe as they are immeasurable. The question of job security is the most important
factor in the life of a worker. The feeling of insecurity not only may be detrimental to
the moral, mental and material development of an individual but it may also cause the
deterioration of the moral and mental standards of the worker which in turn may
cause or contribute to so many complex social problems.
BLACKBURN, supra note 145, at 481 n.64.
145. See SPRANG, supra note 6, at 854.
146. Id.
147. See supra notes 2-3.
148. See, e.g., supra notes 2, 3, 32 and accompanying text.
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to deal with adverse employer actions arising out of the at-will
employment relationship. 4 The long and procedurally cumbersome
judicial process with its motions, discovery requests, and countless
hearings cannot provide adequate or swift relief or remedies to the
employee and employer.' 50
Adequate consideration of the employee's and employer's
interests in at-will employment relationships demands new,
specialized legislation. The judiciary may appropriately respond to
the extreme case or to the atypical situation;5 1 however, courts
have no capacity to construct an administrative mechanism for
daily enforcement and the average employee has no access to their
more formalized process.
Unless more positive action is taken by legislatures to define this
area, courts will continue to signal employers that their
terminations should not be arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory
by recognizing limited causes of action for possible employee
recovery. 5 2 This will continue to be an unnecessarily expensive and
time-consuming process for employees, employers, and courts.
During the past quarter century, employers have certainly been
exposed to and have had sufficient opportunity to learn good
human resource management principles for properly hiring,
disciplining, and terminating employees. These human resource
management principles have been espoued by employer
organizations, including the Society for Human Resource
Management. 51
Undergraduate and graduate programs in human resource
management now routinely exist as part of every major college's
149. See, e.g., supra notes 6, 17, 48 and infra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
150. ST. ANTOINE, UNJUST FIRING, supra note 6, at 35.
151. See, e.g., Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979)
(terminating an employee for refusing to take a polygraph examination); see also Tacket v.
Delco Remy, Division of General Motors Corp., 959 F2d 630 (7th Cir. 1992) (retaliating
against an employee for bringing litigation against the employer); Savodnik v. Korvettes, Inc.,
489 F Supp. 1010 (E.D.N.Y 1980) (avoiding the payment of an employee's pension); Tameny
v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610 P.2d 1330 (Cal. 1980) (terminating an employee for refusing to
participate in an employer's illegal price-fixing scheme); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 384 N.E.2d
353 (111. 1978) (terminating an employee for filing workers' compensation claims); Nees v.
Hocks, 536 P.2d 512 (Or. 1975) (terminating an employee for serving on a jury); Petermann v.
International Board of Teamsters, Inc., 344 P.2d 25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (terminating an
employee for refusing to commit perjury at the employer's command).
152. See supra notes 23-69 and accompanying text discussing at-will employment's
modification by courts during the past quarter century.
153. For example, see the Society for Human Resource Management's web site at
<http://www.shrm.org> for a listing of information available to human resource managers in
promoting good personnel practices.
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and university's curriculum. '1 Even law schools teach employment
law courses that review good human resource management
principles and their application to the at-will employment
relationship. 1 5 These courses and curriculums were not as
widespread a quarter century ago. The marketplace for these
curriculums and employers willingness to hire individuals with
these credentials certainly indicates that employers are more than
ever aware of good human resource management principles and the
need to incorporate them into the modern workplace.
Employers that have not learned these human resource principles
or who care not to follow them should now suffer the
consequences. Society can no longer shield or protect these
employer errors at the at-will employees' cost. This cost to recover
from these harms is far better borne by the irresponsible employer,
who has much more economic power and resources than the
at-will employee.
Any statute should create responsibilities for both employees and
employers in terminations and any other adverse employment
actions, including discipline, demotions, and layoffs. Employees
should be afforded protection for these unwarranted employer
adverse actions. Likewise, employers should be protected for
improper employee actions that usurp corporate opportunities to
work for a competitor, compete against the employer unfairly or
illegally, and steal trade secrets or confidential information. 15
With this experience in place, there is no valid reason why courts
should not expand the doctrine to its logical conclusion by finding
that public policy includes "just cause" for any employer adverse
action or that legislatures should not regulate this area in a more
orderly fashion to alleviate the courts' burden in handling these
disputes. Montana's groundbreaking Wrongful Discharge from
Employment Act certainly indicates that no real burden is placed
on employers through the doctrine's statutory abrogation. 57 This
154.

See generally BARRON'S, PROFILES OF AMERICAN COLLEGES (25th ed. 2000).

155. See, e.g., TEMPLE UNIVESrrY SCHOOL OF LAW CATALOG (2000); VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY
SCHOOL OF LAW CATALOG (2000); WIDENER UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW CATALOG (2000). Since the
early 1990s, various casebooks and materials have been offered for teaching employment law
courses. See, e.g., M. FINKIN, A. GOLDMAN & C. SUMMERS, LEGAL PROTECTION FOR THE INDIVIDUAL
EMPLOYEE (1996); M. ROTHSTEIN & L IAEBMAN, EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (4th ed.
1998); C. SULLIVAN, D. CALLOWAY & M. ZIMMER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT LAW (1993);
S. WILBURN, S. SCHWAB & J. BURTON, JR., EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1993).
156. See generally KURT H. DECKER, COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE (2d ed. 1993); B.
Malsberger (Ed.), COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (2d ed. 1996).

157.

MONT.

CODE ANN.

§§

39-2-902-914

(1998);

see infra notes

182-197

and
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statute has operated effectively for over a decade.
B. State Statutes ProtectingAt-Will Employees
During the past quarter century, at-will employment's modification
has evolved in two distinct phases. First, the courts have taken
action to provide limited protection.'58 Second, state legislatures
have reviewed proposals to provide a more definite, logical, and
orderly means for resolving wrongful termination disputes through
a statutory framework.' 59 This modification of at-will employment
parallels the emergence of private sector collective bargaining
rights prior to the National Labor Relations Act's (NLRA) 1935
enactment. 160
No comprehensive federal wrongful termination legislation
62
exists. 16' Piecemeal state legislation has been adopted in Missouri,
accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 23-69 and accompanying text discussing at-will employment's
modification by courts during the past quarter century. See also PERRmTT, DISMISSAL LAW supra
note 4, at ch. 1 (discussing the increased protection for individual employees from wrongful
terminations); DECKER, EMPLOYEE PRIVACY supra note 4, at ch. 1 (discussing the increased
statutory protection for individual employee rights).
159. See PERRtr, DISMISSAL LAW, supra note 4, at ch. 9.
160. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1998). Prior to the National Labor Relations Act's (NLRAs)
enactment, "there developed a gradual sensitivity on the part of some courts to the need for
fair procedures in the issuance and enforcement of injunctions and, more important, a
legislative sensitivity toward the interests of the laborer." R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR
LAw 3 (1976). See also supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
161. In 1980, United States Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal introduced to the
United States Congress the Corporate Democracy Act. It was an attempt at federal legislative
relief for at-will employees, which, if passed, was to be incorporated into the National Labor
Relations Act. H.R. REP. No. 96-7010, 126 CONG, REC. 2490 (1980). Title IV of the bill provided
in pertinent part:
It is further declared to be the policy of the United States to protect employees in the
security of their employment by ensuring that they are not deprived of such
employment on the basis of their having exercised their constitutional rights, or
because of their refusal to engage in unlawful conduct as a condition of employment.
Id. at § 401(a). The bill also provided that "[elmployees shall have the further right to be
secure in their employment from discharge or adverse action with respect to the terms or
conditions of their employment except for just cause." Id. at § 401(c). The bill defined "just
cause" as follows:
The term "just cause" shall be defined in accordance with the common law of labor
contracts established pursuant to section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act,
except that such term shall not include (A) the exercise of constitutional, civil, or
legal rights; (B) the refusal to engage in unlawful conduct as a condition of
employment; (C) the refusal to submit to polygraph or other similar tests; or (D) the
refusal to submit to a search of someone's person or property, other than routine
inspections, conducted by an employer without legal process.
Id. at § 401(b)(15). At the end of the 96th Congress, with no formal action having been
taken, the Corporate Democracy Act died. See also Sprang, supra note 6 (discussing the
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Puerto Rico, 16 South Carolina, 164 South Dakota, 165 and the Virgin
Islands.166 Other states have enacted statutes protecting
whistleblowers; i.e., employees who report to the government or
their superiors some wrongdoing, waste, or questionable conduct of
their employers. 167 Montana is the only state that has adopted a
comprehensive wrongful termination statute. 168 This limited state
a beginning legislative interest in
activity demonstrates
circumscribing and regulating court modification of at-will
employment.
To statutorily regulate at-will employment, the National
Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws prepared the
Model Employment Termination Act ("Model Act"). 169 The Model
need for a federal statute abrogating at-will employment).
162. Mo. REV. STAT. § 290.140 (1993) (requiring a corporation to provide any employee
who has voluntarily quit or who has been terminated after at least ninety days of
employment, with a letter explaining "the nature and character of service rendered by such
employee to such corporation and duration thereof, and truly stating for what cause, if any,
such employee was discharged or voluntarily quit such service").
163. P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 29, § 185a (1999) (guaranteeing severance pay for the
termination of at-will employees).
164. S.C CODE ANN. § 41-17-10 to 41-17-70 (Law. Co-op. 1986) (requiring the
Commissioner of Labor to mediate disputes in wrongful termination cases and all other
industrial disputes, strikes, or lockouts).
165. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 60-4-5 (Michie 1978) (stating that employment can be
terminated at will only if the employee was not hired for a specified term and an employer
who wishes to terminate such an employee must show that the termination was justified by
"habitual neglect of duty or continued incapacity to perform or any willful breach of duty by
the employee in the course of his employment").
166. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 24, §§ 76-79 (1999) (protecting employees from certain
terminations and providing a review procedure).
167. See, e.g., MICH. STAT. ANN. § 17.428 (Law. Co-op. 1989) (prohibiting employer from
threatening, terminating, or otherwise discriminating against employee who is about to
report a violation of the law by employer); OIo REv. CODE ANN. § 4113.52 (West 1991)
(prohibiting employers from disciplining or taking retaliatory action against employee who
reports violation of state or federal statute, ordinance, or regulation by another employer or
his/her employer); PA_ STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1421-1428 (West 1991) (protects employees who
report a violation or suspected violation of federal, state, or local law and provides
protection for employees who participate in hearings, investigations, legislative inquiries, or
court actions). See also supra notes 72-135 and accompanying text regarding Pennsylvania's
Whistleblower Law.
168. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-902-914 (1998), see infra notes 182-197 and
accompanying text.
169. MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT (August 8, 1991); see infra notes 170-180 and
accompanying text. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
("NCCUSL") generally promulgates uniform acts in areas of law in which it believes that
uniformity among the states is desirable. See generally Day, The National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 8 FIA L REv. 276 (1955). It was organized in the
1890s in response to a movement by the American Bar Association for reform and
unification of American Law. L FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 355 (1973). Model acts

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 38:723

Act is intended as a model for states to use in modifying the at-will
employment relationship. 170 It protects employees from arbitrary
terminations and provides a procedure to review employment
terminations.
The Model Act prohibits the termination of employees employed
by the same employer for a total period of one year or more and
who have worked for the employer at least 520 hours during the 26
weeks next preceding the termination unless "good cause" is
1 72
present. 1 ' Disputed terminations may be submitted to arbitration.
Remedies for an improper termination that the arbitrator has
discretion to award include:
(1) reinstatement to the employment position that the
employee held when employment was terminated or; if that is
impractical, to a comparable position;
(2) full or partial backpay and reimbursement for lost fringe
benefits, with interest, reduced by interim earnings from
employment elsewhere, benefits received, and amounts that
could have been received with reasonable diligence;
(3) if reinstatement is not awarded, a lump-sum severance
payment at the employee's rate of pay in effect before the
termination, for a period not exceeding 36 months after the
date of the arbitrator's award, together with the value of fringe
benefits lost during that period, reduced by likely earnings and
benefits from employment elsewhere, and taking into account
such equitable considerations as the employee's length of
service with the employer and the reasons for the termination;
and
are adopted in areas in which there is a "demand for legislation in a substantial number of
states," but where is no "pressing need" for uniformity. Day, 8 FLRAL. REV. at 282. Uniform
acts are recommended for adoption in all jurisdictions, while model acts are "prepared
merely for the convenience of such legislative bodies as may be interested in them." Id. The
result is that uniform acts should, ideally, be adopted by states with little or no modification.
Model acts, on the other hand, serve only as a blueprint for the states, because uniformity is
not deemed important. In addition, model acts are not considered by state legislatures as
quickly as uniform acts. There are 300 NCCUSL commissioners, with six appointed from
each state. The Model Employment Termination Act was defeated as a uniform act by only a
four-state margin. It was, however, approved as a model act by a vote of 31-19. Sanborn,
At-Will Doctrine Under Fire, NAT'L UJ. 40 (Oct. 14, 1991). See also SPRANG, supra note 6, at
nn. 31-32.
170.

MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION AcT (August 8, 1991).

171.
172.

Id. at §§ 1(1), 1(4), 3.
Id. at § 6.
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17 3
(4) reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

The arbitrator, however, may not make any award for pain and
suffering, emotional distress, defamation, fraud, or other injury
under the common law; punitive damages; compensatory damages;
174
or any other monetary award.
Either the employee or the employer may seek vacation,
modification, or enforcement of the arbitrator's award in the court
of general jurisdiction where the termination occurred or where the
employee resides.1 75 The court may vacate or modify the award
only if it finds that:
(1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other
improper means;
(2) there was evident partiality by the arbitrator or misconduct
prejudicing the rights of either the employee or employer;
(3) the arbitrator exceeded the powers of an arbitrator;
(4) the arbitrator committed a prejudicial error of law; or
(5) another ground exists for vacating the award under the
176
state's arbitration act.
In lieu of an arbitration procedure, the Model Act also allows a
state to elect two additional alternatives as the means of
enforcement as a substitute for arbitration. 177 Alternative A
envisions enforcement through an existing or a new state
administrative agency. 78 Alternative B provides for court
enforcement.179
The Model Act is also required to be posted by the employer at
the workplace.'8 0 As yet, no state has adopted the Model Act.'8 '
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at § 7.
Id.
MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT § 8(a) (August 8, 1991).

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at § 8(c).
Alternatives A-B.
Alternative A, §§ 5-6.
Alternative B, §§ 5-6.

180.

MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION ACT § 9 (August 8, 1991).

181.

The following comment has been offered by Professor Sprang regarding the Model

Act:
The Model Employment Termination Act marks a step in the right direction. It is
significant that the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
concluded that the employment-at-will doctrine should be replaced by a statute. In
their attempt to draft an acceptable statute, however, the commissioners have
compromised too much and have created an inadequate statute that provides many
employees with less protection than that which they currently enjoy under common
law. The Model Act fails to make innocent victims of wrongful discharge whole and
provides no deterrent to wrongful discharge in the future. Furthermore, crafting the
statute as a Model Act, to be adopted on a state-by-state basis, is an anachronistic
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Montana became the first state to enact a comprehensive statute
protecting at-will employees from wrongful termination. 82 The
statute protects employees from wrongful termination in the three
main areas where at-will employees lack safeguards; i.e., Montana
employers are prohibited from terminating employees: (1) without
"good cause;"' 83 (2) in retaliation for refusing to violate public
policy or for reporting a public policy violation;184 or (3) in
violation of the express provisions of an employer's own written
personnel policy.

85

Employees who are wrongfully terminated may be awarded lost
wages and fringe benefits for up to four years, as well as punitive
damages where there is evidence that the employer "engaged in
86
actual fraud or actual malice" in the termination.
"Good cause" is defined as "reasonable, job-related grounds for
dismissal based on a failure to satisfactorily perform job duties,
disruption of the employer's operation, or other legitimate business
reason." 87 "Public policy" includes those policies in effect at the
time of the termination governing public health, safety, or welfare
and
estab)lished by constitutional provision, statute, or
administrative rule.1 ss

The Montana statute preempts common law tort and express or
implied contract remedies. 189 It also provides that employees must
first exhaust any written, internal employer procedures before filing
suit and that any suit against an employer must be filed within a
year after the termination date.1 90 In lieu of court action, parties
solution. In this world of national and multinational corporations, only a federal
statute will effectively address the problem. The proposed federal statute would treat
all wrongful discharges equally, whether motivated by invidious discrimination,
arbitrariness and capriciousness, or other reasons.
The United States is the only industrialized nation in the world that does not have
national legislation protecting employees from wrongful discharge. The time has come
for us not only to join our international colleagues, but to demonstrate leadership by
adopting a federal statute that truly protects employees from wrongful. termination
and provides those employees with meaningful remedies.
SPR NG, supra note 6, at 923-24 (internal footnote omitted).
182. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901-915 (1998).
183. Id. at § 39-2-904.
184. Id. at § 39-2-904 (1).
185. Id. at § 39-2-904 (3).
186. Id. at § 39-2-905.
187. MONT.CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-903(5) (1998).
188. Id. at § 39-2-903 (7).
189. Id. at § 39-2-913.
190. Id. at § 39-2-911(2).
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can agree to final and binding arbitration. 191 If a complaint is filed
under the statute, either party can make a written offer to arbitrate
within 60 days, and the other party has 30 days to accept the offer
192
in writing.
A termination that is subject to other federal or state statutes
providing a procedure or remedy, for example, fair employment
practice statutes, is exempt from the Montana statute. 9 3 Employees
who are covered by collective bargaining agreements or written
employment contract for a specific time period are also excluded
from coverage. 194
The statute's elimination of common law tort actions has not
been found to violate the state's constitution provision guaranteeing
the right of "full legal redress."1915 The state's constitution
guarantees only an access right to courts in seeking a remedy for
wrongs recognized by common law or statute. Furthermore, the
Montana statute's limitation on certain noneconomic damages and
of punitive damages does not violate equal protection by
unconstitutionally burdening a class of claimants seeking wrongful
termination damages.' 96 Rejecting a strict scrutiny standard for
equal protection, the court found that the statute rationally related
to a legitimate state interest of providing greater certainty
alleviating problems experienced by employees and employers in
termination disputes. 19
C. Pennsylvania's Statutory Proposals
Should the courts or the legislature be the primary mover in
modifying at-will employment in Pennsylvania? The Pennsylvania
Superior Court's 1986 decision in Darlington v. General Electric'9 8
brought this question to the forefront. Darlington represents
judicial acknowledgment that at-will employment's modification
should be left to the legislature and not to the courts by stating
191. Id. at § 39-2-914.
192. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-914(3) (1998).
193. Id. at § 39-2-912(1).
194. Id. at § 39-2-912(2).
195. Meech v. Hilihaven West, Inc., 776 P.2d 488 (Mont. 1989) (elimination of common
law tort actions in Montana's Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act does not violate
state's constitution).
196. MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-913 (1998).
197. Johnson v. Montana, 776 P.2d 1221 (Mont. 1989) (classifications created under
Montana Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act do not violate equal protection
guarantees under the state's constitution).
198. 504 A2d 306 (Pa. 1986).

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 38:723

that "if terminable at-will contracts are to be forbidden, the judicial
process may be an inappropriate forum for such sweeping policy
2°0
change." 19 9 This view echoes what was earlier set forth in Geary
relating to courts handling these cases.
In Pennsylvania, several wrongful termination legislative
proposals have been introduced since 1981.201 Each of these
legislative proposals would create a general statutory scheme to
protect Pennsylvania's employees from wrongful termination. None
of these proposals gained widespread support for adoption;
however, legislation protecting employees from wrongful
termination arising out of whistleblowing was enacted. 2°2 The
Whistleblower Law, even though limited to the at-will employment's
public policy exception, however, indicates the willingness of the
Pennsylvania legislature to follow Darlington's203 suggestion in
regulating this area through statute instead of piecemeal judicial
erosion.
Pennsylvania's wrongful termination proposals exclude from
coverage employees protected by a collective bargaining agreement,
those protected by civil service, tenured employees, or persons
199. Darlington,504 A.2d at 310. The Darlington court reasoned:
The citadel of the at-will presumption has been eroded of late, but it has not been
toppled. Perhaps the time has come for employees to be given greater protection in
this area. This was the opinion of one commentator, who cautioned, however, that
"Pennsylvania courts... should at this time avoid further modification of the at-will
employment relationship. Restraint should be observed to minimize the adverse
effects that any complete abrogation might have on employment, productive
efficiency, and overburdening of the judicial process with additional cases. Time and
thought should be given now to whether abrogation of the doctrine should occur
through 'judicial erosion' or 'legislative mandate.' " K.H. Decker, At-Will Employment
in Pennsylvania - A Proposalfor Its Abolition and Statutory Regulation, 87 DicK L
REv. 477, 479 (1983).

Id. The Pennsylvania Superior Court reasserted its position in two subsequent decisions. See
Veno v. Meredith, 515 A.2d 571, 579 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (stating that "[clourts are likely
to be long on generalization and short on detail when the situation requires outlining
procedures and remedies"); Martin v. Capital Cities Media, 51 A.2d 830, 841 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1986) (stating that "[tihe judicial chamber is ill-equipped to determine what effects such a
sweeping policy change [of at-will employment] would have on society. Such a change would
best be accomplished by the legislative process, with its attendant public hearings and
debate.').
200. Geary, 319 A.2d at 179 (noting that suits of this nature could impose a heavy
burden upon the judicial system in terms of an increased case load and thorny problems of
proof).
201. See, e.g, H.R. 1020, 169th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Pa. 1985); H.R. 2105, 168th Leg., Gen.
Sess (Pa. 1984); H.R. 1742, 165th Leg., Gen. Sess., (Pa. 1981).
202. PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
43, §§ 1421-1427 (West 1991). See supra notes 70-135 and
accompanying text.
203. Darlington,504 A.2d at 306.
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who have a written employment contract of not less than two years
duration and whose contracts require not less than six months'
termination notice . 204 The proposals would require employers to
204. See, e.g, H.R. 1020, 169th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Pa. 1985). The text of this proposal
provided:
PENNSYLVANIA HOUSE BILL NO. 1020
INTRODUCED APRIL 23, 1985
REFERRED TO THE COMMITEE ON LABOR RELATIONS
The General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania hereby enacts as
follows:
Section 1. Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the Unjust Dismissal Act.
Section 2. Legislative statement of purpose.
In recent years it has become a well established principle in Pennsylvania case law
that employers do not have an absolute right to terminate employees when the cause
for dismissal arises from issues dealing with public health and safety or matters of
public policy. The right of an employee to be protected from unjust dismissal has,
therefore, been significantly advanced. The purpose of this law is to further establish
these employee rights and to advance them to the point that all employees would
have a process to seek redress when they have been dismissed from employment for
any reason other than just cause.
Section 3. Definitions.
The following words and phrases when used in this act shall have the meanings given
to them in this section unless the context clearly indicates otherwise:
"Bureau." The Bureau of Mediation of the Department of Labor and Industry.
"Dismiss," "dismisses" or "dismissed."
Derivatives of "dismissal."
"Dismissal." An involuntary discharge from employment, including a resignation or
voluntary quit resulting from an improper or unreasonable action or inaction of the
employer. This term and its derivatives shall not be construed to include layoff or any
other type of temporary dismissal.
"Employee." A person who performs a service for wages or other remuneration under
a contract of hire, written or oral, express or implied. The term does not include
those protected by a collective bargaining agreement or those protected by civil
service or tenure against unjust dismissal or a person who has a written employment
contract of not less than two years and whose contract requires not less than six
months' notice of termination.
"Employer." A person who has one or more employees, including an agent of an
employer.
"Registered mail." Includes certified mail.
Section 4. Dismissal of employees.
(a) Grounds - An employer may not dismiss an employee except for just
cause.
An employer who dismisses an employee shall notify the
(b) Notice employee orally at the time of dismissal and in writing by registered mail
within 15 calendar days after the dismissal of all reasons for the dismissal. The
written notice shall set forth the employee's rights and the procedural time
limitations prescribed by this act.
Section 5. Complaints of unjust dismissal.
(a) Form - The complaint may be in narrative form or in numbered paragraph
form. It shall set forth the name and address of the employer and employee,
the date of dismissal and a statement by the employee of the issues. If the
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employee has been provided with a written dismissal notice, the notice may be
attached to the complaint.
(b) Time for filing - An employee who believes that he or she has been
dismissed in violation of section 4(a) may file by registered mail a written
complaint with the bureau not later than 30 days after receipt of the employer's
written notification of dismissal as provided in section 4(b).
(c) Time when notice requirement not met - If an employer fails to provide
the dismissed employee with written notification of the dismissal and the
reason for the action, the dismissed employee may ifie by registered mail a
written complaint, with the bureau not later than 45 calendar days after the
date of the oral notification of dismissal.
Section 6. Mediation.
(a) Appointment of mediator - Upon receipt of a complaint from a dismissed
employee, the bureau shall appoint a mediator to assist the employer and the
dismissed employee in attempting to resolve the dispute.
(b) Explanation of arbitration option - If the dispute is not resolved within 30
calendar days after the commencement of mediation, the mediator shall explain
to the employer and the employee the process and purpose of final and binding
arbitration.
Section 7. Arbitration proceedings.
(a) Request for arbitration - After the option of arbitration is made available
to the dismissed employee, the employee or employer may request a
continuance of mediation if he or she believes that a mutual resolution is likely,
the dismissed employee or the employer may file by registered mail a written
request with the bureau for arbitration of the dispute. If continued mediation
breaks down and mutual resolution becomes impossible, either party may
request arbitration at that time in this same manner.
(b) Hearing - Within 60 calendar days after appointment of an arbitrator, or
within further additional periods to which the parties may agree, the arbitrator
shall call a final hearing and shall give reasonable notice of the time and place
of the hearing to the employer and the employee.
Section 8. Decision of arbitrator.
(a) Time of decision - Within 30 calendar days after the close of the hearing,
or within further additional periods to which the parties may agree, the
arbitrator shall render a signed opinion and award based upon the issues
presented. The arbitrator shall deliver by registered mail a copy of the opinion
and award to the employer, the employee and the bureau.
(b) Remedies - The remedies from which the arbitrator may select include,
but are not limited to, the following:
(1) Sustaining the dismissal.
(2) Reinstating the employee without backpay or with partial or full back
pay.
(3) A severance payment.
(c) Settlement - If the employer and the employee settle their dispute during
the course of the arbitration proceeding, the arbitrator, upon their request, may
set forth the terms of the settlement in the award.
Section 9. Effect of award.
An award of the arbitrator shall be final and binding upon the employer and the
employee and may be enforced, at the instance of either the employer or the
employee, in the court of common pleas for the county in which the dispute arose or
in which the employee resides.
Section 10. Cost of mediation and arbitration.
The normal and necessary expenses of mediation and arbitration, including the cost of
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terminate employees only for "just cause." 0 5 If terminated, the
employee would have to receive oral notification at the time of
termination and written notification by registered mail within
fifteen calendar days of the termination, stating all reasons for the
20 6
action.
The proposed legislation also permits an employee to file a
written complaint concerning his/her termination with the
Pennsylvania Bureau of Mediation within thirty days of the written
notice's receipt. 20 7 After the Bureau receives the complaint, it would
then appoint a mediator to assist the terminated employee and the
employer in resolving the dispute. 08 If, after thirty calendar days
from commencement of mediation, no mutually satisfactory
resolution occurs, the employee could invoke arbitration
2°9
proceedings.
After a hearing, the arbitrator could select remedies that include:
producing a witness, shall be borne by the complainant, but the expenses may be
reimbursed if in the judgment of the arbitrator it would be reasonable and proper to
do so.
Section 11. Judicial review.
The court of common pleas for the county in which the dispute arose or in which the
employee resides may review an award of the arbitrator but only for the reason that
the arbitrator was without, or exceeded the scope of, his jurisdiction, or that the
award was procured by fraud, collusion or other similar and unlawful means. The
pendency of a proceeding for review shall not stay automatically the award of the
arbitrator.
Section 12. Contempt.
Any employer or employee who willfully disobeys a lawful order of enforcement
issued by the court may be held in contempt. The punishment for each day after
issuance that the contempt order remains in effect shall be a fine not to exceed $250
per day.
Section 13. Construction of act.
This act shall not supersede an employer's grievance procedure that provides for
impartial, final and binding arbitration of dismissal-related grievances. Upon the
request of an employer or employee, the bureau shall determine whether or not an
employer's grievance procedure meets with this standard.
Section 14. Posting copy of act.
An employer shall post a copy of this act in a prominent place in the work area.
This act shall take effect immediately.
H.R. 1020, 169th Leg., Gen. Sess. (Pa. 1985).
205. See, e.g., id. § 4(a).
206. See, e.g., id. § 4(b).
207. See, e.g., id. § 5(a). Where the employer fails to provide written notification of the
termination, the employee may file a complaint within 45 calendar days of the termination.
Id.
208. H.R. 1020, 169th Leg., Gen. Sess. § 6(a) (Pa. 1985).
209. See, e.g., id. §§ 6(b), 7(a). The employee may, alternatively, request a continuance
of the mediation if he or she "believes that a mutual resolution of the dispute is possible."
Id. § 7(a).
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(1) sustaining the termination; (2) reinstating the employee with no,
partial, or full backpay; and (3) ordering a severance payment.21 0
The arbitrator's decision would be final and binding upon the
parties, and reviewable in the court of common pleas for the
21
county where the dispute arose or where the employee resides. '
However, if a party sought judicial review, the court could set aside
the award only if the arbitrator "was without, or exceeded the
scope of, his jurisdiction, or that the award was procured by fraud,
212
collusion or other similar and unlawful means."
Pennsylvania's legislative proposals provide a beginning reference
point to modify the at-will employment relationship. However, in
their present form they are inadequate to meet today's employment
needs. The proposals make no provision for preempting other
federal or state statutes. Exclusivity of the procedure is not
provided for when it is selected over competing statutes. Arbitrator
selection is not clearly defined even though it would appear to be
solely in the Bureau's jurisdiction.
The proposals should not place the costs of the mediation and
arbitration initially on the employee. This may have a tendency to
deter its use. Standards for an acceptable employer grievance
arbitration procedure should be also clearly defined in the statute
to provide for a fair, impartial, and regular procedure to include,
but not be limited to sharing of the arbitration's cost or placing the
cost totally on the employer and selection of the arbitrator by both
the employee and employer.
D. Proposed Statute
Based on the Pennsylvania appellate courts' decisions 213 since
Geary,21 4 it is apparent that even though Pennsylvania recognizes
certain exceptions to the at-will employment doctrine, little
appellate case law has resulted since 1974 where at-will employees
have been overwhelmingly successful against their employers in
215
recovering damages.
Pennsylvania decisions are replete with remands, recognizing a
cause of action but not finding sufficient facts to sustain the claim,
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

See, e.g., id. § 8(b).
See, e.g., id. § 9.
See, e.g., id. § 11.
See supra notes 48-67 and accompanying text.
Geary, 319 A.2d at 174.

215.

See supra notes 48-67 and accompanying text.
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etc. 216 In other words, "on the books" exceptions to the doctrine
exist, but little success at employee recovery is guaranteed because
there is always some reason for the court to find in denying
217
recovery.
Despite these results, employees have continued to bring these
claims with the possible implication of overburdening the
judiciary.218 In the future, based on the prior quarter century of
litigation experience, the appellate court case load can be expected
to increase to deal with at-will employment cases. 219 Piecemeal
modification of the doctrine and overburdening of the courts with
these cases will continue until a case arises that shocks the court's
sensibility enough to finally find that Pennsylvania's public policy
contains a "just cause" provision in every employment contract for
every adverse employment action.
The time has come for either Pennsylvania's courts to modify
at-will employment by finding a public policy "just cause"
requirement arising out of any adverse employment action or for
legislation to be enacted to achieve this objective. It is undisputed
that courts should not hear these cases unless a separate labor
220
court is created.
Should a separate labor court not be a viable alternative, final
and binding arbitration under a state statute would be the ideal
vehicle to accomplish this.2 21 Arbitration of these disputes coincides
with a half century's successful experience under private and public
216. See supra notes 48-67 and accompanying text.
217. See supra notes 48-67 and accompanying text.
218. See supra notes 4867 and accompanying text.
219. See supra notes 48-67 and accompanying text.
220. This suggestion has been previously advanced by other commentators within the
United States. See Dallas L. Jones & Russell A. Smith, Management and Labor Appraisals
and Criticisms of the Arbitration Process: A Report with Comments, 62 MICH. L REv. 1115,
1122 and n. 11 (1964). A system of specialized labor courts has been successful in Denmark,
Germany, and Sweden. These courts could be operated with a simplified procedure like that
used in by district justices. In this way, cases could be readily presented by human resource
managers, union representatives, or other laypersons without the necessity of being
represented by attorneys. In simple cases, the use of attorneys may only obfuscate and
complicate what is readily apparent. These courts would also be equipped to hear complex
cases to give full scope to representation by attorneys. See P. HAYES, LABOR ARBITRATION - A
DISSENTING VIEW 116-18 (1966); see also IL B. AARON & D. FARWELL (EDS.), EMPLOYMENT
TERMINATIONS (1984).

221. See, e.g., MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to 39-2-915 (1998) (providing for the final
and binding arbitration of wrongful terminations). See also MODEL EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION
ACT (1991) (recommending final and binding arbitration of wrongful termination claims). For
a discussion of Montana's Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act and the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws' Model Employment Termination Act
see supra notes 168-197 and accompanying text.
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sector collective bargaining agreements. 222
An effective statute should take the initial handling of these
disputes out of the court's jurisdiction. Instead, arbitrators trained
in employment law matters should handle all employment related
matters. These arbitrators' awards should receive the same court
22 3
deference as arbitrators' awards in other labor matters receive.
Arbitration would provide a proven, quick, inexpensive, and final
224
resolution without overburdening the courts.
The statute should articulate a standard for lawful termination,
discipline, or other adverse employment actions in terms similar to
"just cause."225 Certain employees should be excluded from the
statute's coverage. Among those appropriately excluded are
probationary employees and employees covered by an employment
contract, employment handbook providing a fmal and binding
222.

For a general discussion of arbitration under private and public sector collective

bargaining agreements see T. BORNSTEIN & A. GOSLINE (EDS.), LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
ARBITRATION (1990); 0. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION (2D ED.
1983); E. GOGGIN & M VOLZ (EDS.), ELKOURI AND ELKOURI: How ARBITRATION WORKS (5TH ED.
1997). See also N. BRAND (ED.) DISCIPLINE AND DISCHARGE IN ARBITRATION (1998); HAAGEN (ED.),
ARBITRATION Now: OPPORTUNITY FOR FAIRNESS, PROCESS RENEWAL AND INVIGORATION (2000); T. ST.
ANTOINE (ED), THE COMMON LAW OF THE WORKPLACE: THE VIEWS OF ARBITRATORS (1998).
223. For example, in the private sector under the National Labor Relations Act,

arbitrators' awards are given considerable deference by the courts when these awards are
reviewed. See United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960)
(holding that interpretation of the dispute under the agreement is for the arbitrator and the
courts will not review the merits of an arbitration award); United Steelworkers v. Warrior &
Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960) (holding that the arbitrability of the employment
dispute is for the arbitrator to determine in the first instance and not the courts; i.e., doubts
as to coverage of the arbitration clause should be resolved in favor of arbitrability); United
Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) (holding that where a valid
arbitration agreement exists, courts will compel arbitration of the dispute where on its face
it is covered by the agreement). The grievance arbitration procedure has been described as
being
at the very heart of the system of industrial self-government. Arbitration is the means
of solving the unenforceable by molding a system of private law for all the problems
which may arise and to provide for their solution in a way which will generally accord
with the variant needs and desires of the parties. The processing of the disputes
through the grievance machinery is actually a vehicle by which meaning and content
is given to the collective bargaining agreement . . . The grievance procedure is, in
other words, a part of the continuous collective bargaining process.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 581. See also United Paperworkers Int'l Union v.
Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987) (stating that in cases involving collective bargaining
agreements, "courts play only a limited role when asked to review the decision of an
arbitrator"); Kurt H. Decker, The Recent Impact of Statutory Law on Contract Interpretation
in Public Education Grievance Arbitration, 4 J. CoLLECTIvE NEGOIATIONS IN THE PUBLIC
SECTOR 359 (1975) (discussing the role of arbitration as the favored means of resolving
employment disputes).

224. See MENNEMEIER, supra note 6.
225. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
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arbitration procedure that is fair, regular, and neutral, or collective
bargaining agreement providing a final and binding arbitration
procedure that is fair, regular, and neutral.
Since the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,22 6 more and more courts and
the resolution of employment disputes
employers have supported
22 7
through arbitration.
226. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). See also Kurt H. Decker, Gardner-Denverto Gilmer: The Facts
and Possibilitiesfor Arbitration, 2 J. OF INDWIDUAL EMPLOYMENT RIGHTs 305 (1993-94).
227. A majority of federal and state courts hold that agreements to arbitrate statutory
discrimination claims and other workplace employment disputes are valid so long as the
employee does not waive any rights or remedies under the statutes and the arbitrage process
is fair. No. 74 DAILY LABOR REPORTER, A-9 (April 19, 1999). See, e.g., In re Prudential Ins. Co.,
133 F3d 225 (3d Cir. 1998) (insurance agents must submit their dispute to arbitration);
Zandford v. Prudential-Bache Sec., 112 F.3d 723 (4th Cir. 1997) (terminated securities
executive required to submit his dispute to arbitration); Rojas v. TK Communications, Inc.,
87 F.3d 745 (5th Cir. 1996) (female disc jockey whose employment contract required
arbitration of "any other disputes" must submit sexual harassment, retaliation, and
constructive discharge claims to arbitration); Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, 113 F3d 832 (8th
Cir. 1997) (employee's discrimination claims are required to be arbitrated under .employment
handbook's procedure); Painewebber, Inc. v. Agron, 49 F.3d 347 (8th Cir. 1995) (arbitration
award overturning employee's termination should not be vacated on ground that it violates
at-will employment doctrine, where use of arbitration as means of settling
employment-related disputes necessarily alters employment relationship from at-will to
standard that infers some level of cause so that arbitration panel can determine whether
termination was justified); Continental Airlines v. Mason, 12 Int'l. Envt'l. Rep. 140 (C.D. Cal.
1995), affd, 87 F.3d 1318 (9th Cir. 1996) (employee must arbitrate her termination pursuant
to employment handbook's arbitration procedure where procedure is neither contrary to
parties' reasonable expectations nor unduly oppressive); Lang v. Burlington Northern R.R.
Co., 835 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Minn. 1993) (mandatory arbitration provision that was added to
employment handbook 26 years after employee was hired bars wrongful termination lawsuit,
where written arbitration provision was distributed to employees for insertion in their
handbooks, and became binding unilateral contract when employee accepted employer's
offer of changed condition by his continued employment; arbitration provision was not
contract of adhesion since there was no evidence that it resulted from fraud or was
inherently unfair); McNulty v. Prudential-Bache Securities, 871 F Supp. 567 (E.D.N.Y 1994)
(as an employment condition employee was required to arbitrate disputes); Southtrust
Securities v. McClellan, 730 So.2d 620 (Ala 1999) (stockbroker must arbitrate claim); Gold
Kist v. Baker, 730 So.2d 614 (Ala. 1999) (employee must arbitrate workers' compensation
claim); Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton, Seripps, 88 Cal. Rptr.2d 664 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)
(employee who was terminated for refusing to sign predispute arbitration agreement
requiring that nonstatutory work-related disputes be resolved through binding arbitration and
that losing party pay allcosts, including legal fees, has no claim for wrongful termination in
violation of public policy); Brown v. KFC Nat'l Management Co., 921 P.2d 146 (Haw. 1996)
(employee compelled to submit to binding arbitration his claims of racial discrimination
relating to his resignation or termination); Rembert v. Ryan's Family Steak House, Inc., 596
N.W.2d 208 (Mich. Ct. App. 1999) (predispute agreements to arbitrate statutory employment
discrimination claims are valid so long as the employee does not waive any rights or
remedies under the statute and the arbitration is fair); Fastenberg v. Prudential Ins., 707 A.2d
209 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1998) (insurance company vice president must arbitrate his
claims of wrongful termination, defamation, and negligent misrepresentation). But see Circuit
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The court's decision in Gilmer 28 represents a departure from the
position of some federal courts that had interpreted Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver2 29 to mean that federal civil rights actions were not
subject to compulsory arbitration. 23° Gilmer 3 ' decided that
employees in the securities industry whose registration agreements
included a compulsory arbitration provision could be required to
arbitrate age discrimination claims.
In recent years, employers have increasingly evaluated the
benefits of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) procedures, which
contain final and binding arbitration, to resolve employment related
claims. 232 ADR offers the advantages of decreased litigation costs,
minimized back pay awards due to quicker resolution of
termination claims, removal of cases from high-risk jury trials, and
2
a private proceeding not open to the public. 3
One disadvantage to the inclusion of compulsory arbitration
clauses in employment agreements or handbooks has been the
perception that arbitration would be of little benefit if employees
could bypass arbitration or in addition to using the arbitration
procedure still independently litigate federal or state statutory
discrimination claims or other employment claims in court or
before federal or state administrative agencies.234 Employers fear
that an arbitrator's decision on a statutory claim might not receive
any deference in later litigation.
Any ADR procedure "that uses arbitration should be a "true
City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 194 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 1999) (refusal to enforce employer's
procedure to arbitrate state law discrimination claims); Lambdin v. District Court, 18th
Judicial District, Arapahoe County, 903 P.2d 1126 (Colo. 1995) (employee cannot waive
statutory rights by entering into an arbitration agreement). See also Stuart H. Bompey et al.,
The Attack on Arbitration and Mediation of Employment Disputes, 13 LAB. LAw. 21 (1997);
Michael Delikat & Rene Kathawala, Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims
under Pre-DisputeAgreements: Will Gilmer Survive?, 16 HorsTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 83 (1998);
Jay S. Siegel, Changing Public Policy: PrivateArbitration to Resolve Statutory Employment
Disputes, 13 LAB. LAw 87 (1997).
228. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20.
229. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (collective bargaining
agreement's grievance arbitration procedure cannot preclude employee from also filing a fair
employment practice claim).
230. See, e.g., Nordin v. Nutri/System, Inc., 897 F.2d 339 (8th Cir. 1990) (denying
employee's motion to compel arbitration despite mandatory arbitration clause in settlement
agreement).
231. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20.
232. See generally H. KRAMER, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE WORKPLACE (1999);
A WESTIN & A FEIJU, RESOLVING EMPLOYMENT DisPutrEs wmiouT LITIGATION (1988).

233. R. Duston, Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.,: A Major Step Forwardfor
Alternative Dispute Resolution, or a Meaningless Decision?, 7 LAB. LAw. 823 (1991).
234. See supra note 227.
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arbitration procedure." It should at a minimum have: (1) an
impartial third-party decision-maker; (2) a mechanism for ensuring
neutrality of the third party decision-maker with respect to
rendering the decision; (3) a neutral third-party decision-maker
chosen by the employee and employer; (4) an opportunity for the
employee and employer to be heard; and (5) a final and binding
decision as its culmination.
Based on decisions 235 supporting Gilmer236 it may be worthwhile
for the Pennsylvania legislature to consider arbitration of all
employment disputes. Characteristics of enforceable arbitration
procedures indicate that it should: (1) be contained in a
employment handbook or other employer writing; (2) be
communicated to the employee;2 7 (3) be supported by
consideration;213 (4) be documented that the employee made a
knowing and voluntary waiver to file a claim under any federal or
state statute; 239 however, the employee should retain the same
rights under any federal or state statute waived and the arbitrator
should retain the right to award the same remedies under any
federal or state statute waived;240 (5) provide for the employee and
the employer to select the neutral arbitrator; 24' (6) require the cost
235. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 619 N.E.2d 998 (N.Y.S.2d 1993), cert.
denied, 510 U.S. 993 (1993) (compulsory arbitration bars judicial resolution of state fair
employment practice claims); Duello v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin, 501
N.W.2d 38 (Wis.2d 1993) (Title VII attorney's fees denied for internal employee ADR
procedure).
236. Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 20.
237. See, e.g., Lang v, Burlington R.R., 835 F. Supp. 1104 (D. Minn. 1993) (distribution
of employment handbook containing mandatory arbitration provision to employee became
binding unilateral contract when employee accepted employer's offer of changed condition
by continuing employment).
238. See, e.g., Michalski v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 177 F3d 634 (7th Cir. 1999)
(arbitration agreement enforceable where mutual consideration to arbitrate present).
239. See, e.g., Prudential Ins. Co. v. Lai, 42 F.3d 1299 (9th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 516
U.S. 812 (1995) (female former employees were not bound by any valid agreement to
arbitrate employment disputes, since they did not knowingly contract to forego statutory
remedies in favor of arbitration).
240. See, e.g., Trumbull v. Century Marketing Corp., 12 F. Supp.2d 683 (N.D. Ohio 1998)
(employer was not entitled to enforcement of arbitration clause contained in employment
handbook where arbitrator was not permitted to award the same remedies that were
available in the judicial forum); Rembert v. Ryan's Family Steak House, Inc., 596 N.W.2d 208
(Mich. App. 1999) (agreements to arbitrate statutory employment discrimination claims are
valid so long as the employee does not waive any rights or remedies under the statute and
the arbitration process is fair).
241. See, e.g., Hooters of America, Inc., v. Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999)
(arbitration procedure unenforceable where it was crafted by employer to ensure that
arbitrator would not be neutral); Cheng-Canindin v. Renaissance Hotel Assocs., 57 Cal.
Rptr.2d 867 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (employment handbook's arbitration provision not
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of the arbitrator to be paid entirely by the employer;2 42 (7) allow for
the employee to be represented by an attorney or other person; (8)
2
permit the presentation of witnesses and documentary evidence; 4
and (9) state that it is the sole and exclusive remedy for any and
all employment disputes and the results are final and binding on
2
the employee and the employer. 4
Further support for the use of employment dispute arbitration for
at-will employees exists in previous Pennsylvania legislation
245
recognizing it as a vehicle to resolve these matters.
Outlined below is a proposal for a statute that protects
Pennsylvania's at-will employees and employers when employment
disputes arise.
ARBITRATION OF EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES FOR EMPLOYEES AND EMPLOYERS

Section 1. Short Title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Act for
enforceable where employee could not participate in neutral arbitrator's selection).
242. See, e.g., Davis v. LPK Corp., 78 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 32 (N.D. Cal. 1998)
(employer cannot preserve validity of arbitration agreement that provides for employee to
pay one-half of the costs, even though employer offered to advance all costs subject to
reimbursement by the employee if the employer prevailed or to bear entire arbitration cost);
Shankle v. B-G Maintenance Management, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 94 (D. Colo. 1997),
aff"d remanded, 163 F.3d 1230 (10th Cir. 1999) (arbitration agreement's provision requiring
employee to pay one-half of arbitrator's fees renders agreement unenforceable where
provision operates as a disincentive to submitting discrimination claim to arbitration and
precludes arbitration from being reasonable substitute for judicial forum); Maciejewski v.
Alpha Sys. Lab, Inc., 87 Cal. Rptr.2d 390 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999), as modified, 986 P.2d 170 (Cal.
1999) (arbitration agreement splitting costs between employee and employer considered
unconscionable and unenforceable).
243. Cheng-Canindin, 57 Cal. Rptr.2d at 867 (employment handbook's arbitration
provision not enforceable where employer controlled what evidence could be presented).
244. M. Weisel, After the Gilmer Decision: Effectiveness of Arbitration Clauses in
Employment Contracts, 1 J. of Individual Employment Rights 323 (1992-93).
245. The Act of June 24, 1968, Act 111, 1968 Pa. Laws 237 (Act 111), established the
rights of Pennsylvania police and fire employees to organize and bargain collectively through
selected representatives; however, no strike right was granted and disputes were to be
resolved through final and binding arbitration. PA STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 217.1-.10 (West 1991).
All other Pennsylvania public employees were given the right to organize and bargain
collectively, including a limited strike right for certain public employees, by the Act of July
23, 1970, No. 195, 1970 Pa. Laws 563 (Act 195), with final and binding arbitration for certain
public employees who are not permitted to strike, final and binding arbitration for all public
employees and employees who enter into a collective bargaining agreement to resolve any
and all disputes arising under the agreement, and either advisory or final and binding
arbitration for those public employees and employers who agree to use it to resolve
negotiations over a new collective bargaining agreement. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §
1101.101-2301 (West 1991).
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Section 2. Definitions.
The following words and phrases when used in this act shall have,
unless clearly indicated otherwise, the meanings given to them in
this section:
"Appointing Authority." The Pennsylvania Bureau of Mediation.
"Bureau." The Bureau of Mediation of the Department of
Labor and Industry.
"Court of Common Pleas." The Court of Common Pleas for the
county where the employment dispute arose.
"Employee." Any person who performs a service for wages or
other remuneration under a contract of hire that is written,
oral, express, or implied. Employee includes any person
employed by an individual, person, partnership, association,
corporation, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
including any of its political subdivisions, or any agency,
authority, board, or commission created by a political
subdivision. Employee shall not include anyone: (a) covered
by a collective bargaining agreement that contains a final and
binding arbitration procedure for the review of all employment
disputes arising under or out of the agreement; (b) covered by
an employment handbook, employment manual, or
employment policy that contains a final and binding arbitration
procedure for the review of employment disputes arising out
of the employment relationship that permits the employee to
participate in selecting a neutral arbitrator with the employer
and does not require the employee to pay any charges or fees
for the arbitrator's services; (c) protected by a statutory civil
service or tenure procedure of either the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania or any of its political subdivisions, or any
agency, authority, board, or commission created by a political
subdivision; (d) who has a written employment agreement that
contains a final and binding arbitration procedure for the
review of employment disputes arising out of or under the
agreement that permits the employee to participate in
selecting the neutral arbitrator with the employer and does not
require the employee to pay any charges or fees for the
arbitrator's services; or (e) that is in a probationary status.
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This term shall also include the employee's representative for
the purposes of filing a complaint and appearing at the
arbitration hearing.
"Employer." Any individual, person, partnership, association,
corporation, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,
including any of its political subdivisions or any agency,
authority, board, or commission created by a political
subdivision. This term shall also include the employer's
representative for the purposes of filing a complaint and
appearing at the arbitration hearing.
"Employment Dispute." Any adverse employment action that
arises out of the employment relationship between an
employee and employer, including, but not limited to disputes
arising over discipline, termination, resignation, layoff, recall,
demotion, promotion, disloyalty, theft of trade secrets, unfair
competition, etc., that result from improper action or inaction
of an employee or employer. However, disputes relating to the
receipt of unemployment
compensation and workers'
compensation are specifically excluded from this act's
coverage and scope.
"Just Cause." As established by arbitrators under the common
law developed as part of the federal National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 and the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania's private and public sector collective bargaining
statutes.
"Person." Any individual,
association,
corporation,
Pennsylvania, including any
agency, authority, board, or
subdivision.

sole proprietorship, partnership,
and the Commonwealth
of
of its political subdivisions or any
commission created by a political

"Probationary Status." A period of time of one hundred and
eighty (180) consecutive calendar days or less that occurs
immediately after an employee is initially hired by an
employer for the first time unless a time period of at least
three (3) years has passed since the employee's last
employment by the employer. It shall not include situations
where an already employed employee is given a new
employment position, advancement, promotion, or demotion
by his/her employer.
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Section 3. Employment Dispute.
An employee or employer shall not adversely effect the interests of
the other in any manner that gives rise to an employment disputes
unless there is just cause for the action or inaction that is not
arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory.
Section 4. Employment Disputes -

Complaints.

An employee or employer who believes that an employment dispute
has occurred or arisen in violation of section 3 may file by certified
mail return receipt requested a written request for arbitration of
the dispute with the Bureau of Mediation. The written request for
arbitration shall be mailed by certified mail return receipt request
not later than ninety (90) calendar days after the employment
dispute occurred or arose.
Section 5. Arbitration.
(a) Appointment. Where a written request for arbitration has
been filed with the Bureau of Mediation, the Bureau shall
provide the employee and employer with a list of seven (7)
arbitrators names within forty-five (45) calendar days after the
request is received. Within fifteen (15) calendar days after
receipt of the list by the employee and employer, the
employee and employer shall meet for the purpose of selecting
the arbitrator by alternately striking one name from the list
until one name remains who shall be the arbitrator. The
employer shall strike the first name from the list. Within five
(5) calendar days after the arbitrator's name is selected from
the list, the employee and employer shall in writing notify the
Bureau of the arbitrator's name. Upon receipt of the
arbitrator's name, the Bureau shall notify the arbitrator in
writing of his/her appointment.
(b) Hearing. Within thirty (30) calendar days after
appointment, or within further additional time periods as the
employee and employer may in writing agree, the arbitrator
shall schedule a hearing.
(c) Conduct of Hearing. The hearing shall be conducted in the
46
following manner:
246.

See DECKER, supra note 6, at 496-502; AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, NATIONAL

RuLEs FOR THE RESOLUTION OF EMPLOYMENT DIsPuTEs (January 1, 1999).
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(1) Arbitration Management Conference - As soon as
possible after the arbitrator's appointment but not later
than sixty (60) calendar days thereafter, the arbitrator
shall conduct an Arbitration Management Conference
with the employee and employer and/or their
representatives, in person or by telephone, to explore and
resolve matters that will expedite the arbitration
proceedings. The specific matters to be discussed shall
include:
(i) The issues to be arbitrated;
(ii) The date, time, place, and estimated duration of
the hearing;
(iii) The resolution of outstanding discovery issued
and establishment of discovery parameters;
(iv) The law, standards, rules of evidence, and
burdens of proof that are to apply;
(v) The exchange of stipulations and declarations
regarding facts, exhibits, witnesses, and other issues;
(vi) The names of witnesses, including expert
witnesses, the scope of witness testimony, and
witness exclusion;
(vii) The value of bifurcating the arbitration hearing
into a liability phase and a damages phase;
(viii) The need for a stenographic record;
(ix) Whether the employee and employer will
summarize their arguments orally or in writing;
(x) The form of the award; and
(xi) Any other issues relating to the hearing's subject
matter or conduct.
The arbitrator shall issue promptly or within a reasonable
time period oral and written orders reflecting his/her
decisions on the above matters and may conduct
additional conferences when the need arises.
(2) Date, Time, and Place of Hearing - The employee
and employer may mutually agree upon the locale where
the arbitration is to be held. If there is a dispute as to the
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appropriate local, the arbitrator shall determine the local
and his/her decision shall be final and binding. The
arbitrator shall have the authority to set the date, time,
and place of the hearing after discussion with the
employee and employer. At least thirty (30) calendar days
prior to the hearing, the arbitrator shall mail notice of the
date, time, and place of the hearing.
(3) Vacancies - If the arbitrator should resign, die,
withdraw, refuse, or be unable or disqualified to perform
his/her duties, the Bureau shall on proof satisfactory to it,
declare a vacancy. Vacancies shall be filled by the Bureau
in the same manner as the making of the original
appointment and the matter shall be reheard by the new
arbitrator.
(4) Representation- The employee or the employer may
be represented at the hearing by an attorney of any other
representative of their choosing who is trained or
experienced in employment matters.
(5) Stenographic Record If the employee or the
employer desires a stenographic record, the employee or
the employer shall make the necessary arrangements with
a stenographer and shall notify the other of these.
arrangements at least five (5) calendar days prior to the
scheduled hearing. The requesting party or parties shall
pay the cost of the stenographic record. If the transcript
is agreed to by the employee and the employer, or
determined by the arbitrator to be the official record of
the proceeding, it shall be provided to the arbitrator and
made available to the other parties for inspection, at a
date, time, and place to be determined by the arbitrator.
(6) Interpreters - If the employee or the employer
desires an interpreter, the employee or the employer shall
make the necessary arrangements directly with the
interpreter and shall assume the service's costs and
expenses.
(7) Attendance at Hearings - The hearing shall be a
private and confidential hearing with no right of the
public, the press, communications media, or any other
person to attend unless the employee and the employer
agree to this attendance. The arbitrator shall have the
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authority to exclude witnesses, other than a party, from
the hearing during the testimony of any witness. The
arbitrator also shall have the authority to decide whether
any person who is not a witness, outside of those persons
excluded by this section, who may attend the hearing;
provided that the person has a legitimate interest that is
related to the hearing and maintains the hearing's
confidentiality.
(8) Confidentiality - The arbitrator shall maintain the
hearing's confidentiality and shall have the authority to
make appropriate rulings to safeguard that confidentiality,
unless the employee and employer agree otherwise or the
law provides to the contrary.
(9) Postponements - The arbitrator: (a) may postpone
any hearing upon the request of the employee or the
employer for good cause shown; (b) must postpone any
hearing upon the mutual agreement of the employee and
the employer; and (c) may postpone any hearing on his/
her own initiative.
(10) Oaths - Before proceeding with the testimony, the
arbitrator may, in his/her discretion, or if requested by
either the employee or the employer require witnesses to
testify under oath administered by him/her.
(11) Arbitration in the Absence of Either the Employee
or the Employer - The arbitration may proceed in the
absence of either the employee or the employer who,
after due written notice, fails to be present or fails to
obtain a postponement. An award shall not be based
solely on the employee's or the employer's default. The
arbitrator shall require whomever is in attendance to
present evidence as the arbitrator may require for the
making of an award.
(12) Evidence - The employee or the employer may
offer any evidence that is relevant and material to the
employment dispute and shall produce any evidence as
the arbitrator deems necessary to an understanding and
determination of the dispute. An arbitrator may subpoena
witnesses or documents upon the request of the
employee, the employer, or independently by himself/
herself. The arbitrator shall be the judge of the relevance
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and materiality of the evidence offered, and conformity to
legal rules of evidence shall not be necessary or required.
The arbitrator may in his/her discretion direct the order
of proof, bifurcate the proceedings, exclude cumulative or
irrelevant testimony or other evidence, and direct the
employee and employer to focus their presentations on
issues the decision of which could dispose of all or part
of the case. All evidence shall be taken in the presence of
the arbitrator, the employee, and the employer, except
where either the employee or the employer is absent
without good cause, in default, or has waived the right to
be present.
(13) Evidence by Affidavit or Declaration and
Post-HearingFiling of Documents or Other Evidence The arbitrator may receive and consider the evidence of
witnesses by affidavit, but shall give it only the weight as
the arbitrator deems it entitled to after consideration of
any objection made to its admission. If the employee and
the employer agree or the arbitrator directs that
documents or other evidence may be submitted to the
arbitrator after the hearing, the documents or evidence
shall be filed with the Bureau for transmission to the
arbitrator, unless the employee and the employer agree to
a different method of distribution. The employee and the
employer shall be afforded an opportunity to examine
these documents or other evidence and to lodge
appropriate objections, if any
(14) Inspection or Investigation - An arbitrator finding
it necessary to make an inspection or investigation in
connection with the arbitration hearing shall advise the
employee and the employer. The arbitrator shall set the
date, time, and place of the inspection or investigation
and advise the employee and the employer in writing. The
employee and the employer may be present during the
inspection or investigation. In the event that either the
employee, the employer, or both is not present during the
inspection or investigation, the arbitrator shall make an
oral or written report to the employee and the employer
and afford them the opportunity to comment.
(15) Interim Measures - At the request of the employee
or the employer, the arbitrator may take whatever interim

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 38:723

measures he/she deems necessary with respect to the
dispute, including measures for the conservation of
property. These interim measures may be taken in the
form of an interim award and the arbitrator may require
security for the costs of these measures.
(16) Closing of Hearing The arbitrator shall
specifically inquire of the employee and the employer
whether they have any further proofs to offer or
witnesses to be heard. Upon receiving negative replies or
if satisfied that the record is complete, the arbitrator shall
declare the hearing closed. If briefs are to be filed, the
hearing shall be declared closed as of the final date for
the receipt of briefs. If other documents are to filed as
set forth in section 6(c)(13) and the date set for their
receipt is later than that set for the receipt of briefs, the
later date shall be the date of the hearing's closing. The
time limit within which the arbitrator is required to make
the award shall commence to run, in the absence of other
agreements by the employee and the employer, upon the
hearing's closing.
(17) Reopening of Hearing - The hearing may be
reopened by the arbitrator upon the arbitrator's initiative,
or upon application of the employee or the employer for
cause shown, at any time before the award is issued. If
reopening the hearing would prevent the making of the
award within the specific time for making the award set
by this act or within the specific time agreed upon for
making the award by the employee and the employer, the
hearing may not be reopened unless the employee and
the employer agree on an extension of time for making
the award.
(18) Waiver of Oral Hearing - The employee and the
employer may provide, by written agreement, for the
waiver of oral hearings in any employment dispute.
(19) Waiver of Objection/Lack of Compliance with these
Procedures - If the employee or the employer proceeds
with the arbitration after any provision or requirement of
these procedures has not been complied with, and who
fails to state objection thereto in writing, the employee or
the employer shall be deemed to have waived the right to
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object.
(20) Time Extensions - The employee and the employer
may modify any time period by mutual written agreement.
(21) Serving of Notice The employee and the
employer shall be deemed to have consented that any
papers, notices, or process necessary or proper for the
initiation or continuation of the arbitration; for any court
actions in connection therewith; or for the entry of
judgment on an award made under this act may be served
upon the employee or the employer by mail or personal
service addressed to the employee, the employer, or their
respective representative at the last know address. The
arbitrator may also use facsimile transmission, telex,
telegram, e-mail, or other written forms of electronic
communication to give the notice required by these
procedures.
(22) Judicial Proceedings - The arbitrator is not a
necessary party in any subsequent judicial proceedings
relating to the arbitration unless the court so requires.
(d) The Award. After the hearing's close, the arbitrator, based
upon the issues presented, shall render a written opinion
outlining the reasons for the award as follows:
(1) The award shall made promptly by the arbitrator and,
unless otherwise agreed to by the employee and the
employer, no later than thirty (30) calendar days from the
hearing's closing date.
(2) An award issued under this act shall not be publicly
available unless the employee and the employer agree in
writing to make it available.
(3) The award shall be in writing and shall be signed by
the arbitrator and it shall provide written reasons for the
award unless the employee and the employer agree
otherwise.
(4) If the employee and the employer settle their
employment dispute during the course of the arbitration,
the arbitrator may set forth the terms of the settlement in
a consent award.
(5) The employee and the employer shall accept as legal

Vol. 38:723

Duquesne Law Review

delivery of the award the placing of the award or a true
copy thereof in the mail or by personal service, addressed
to the employee, the employer, or their respective
representative at the last known address.
(6) Within twenty (20) calendar days after the award's
transmittal, the employee or the employer, upon notice to
the other, may request the arbitrator to correct any
clerical, typographical, technical, or computational errors
in the award. The arbitrator shall not be empowered to
redetermine the merits of any claim already decided. The
other party shall be given ten (10) calendar days to
respond to the request. The arbitrator shall dispose of the
request within twenty (20) calendar days after the
request's receipt.
(7) The arbitrator's award shall be final and binding on
the employee and the employer. Judicial review shall
limited as set forth in this act.
(e) Remedies. The remedies from which the arbitrator may
select include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) Sustaining the employment dispute against the
employee or the employer with or without a monetary
award.
(2) Reinstating the employee with no, partial, or full back
pay.
(3) A severance payment.
(4) Adding a reasonable rate of interest to any monetary
award.
(5) Requiring restitution for any employee or employer
property.
(6) Punitive damages in an amount not to exceed three
times the amount, of monetary damages actually awarded.
(7) Attorney's
representative.

fees

or

other

fees

for

a

party's

(8) A cease and desist order to restrain any employee or
employer action.
(9) Any other remedy permitted under the law, including
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those under any applicable federal or state law.

(f) Costs of Arbitration.The employee and the employer shall
bear their own costs for witnesses and the presenting of their
respective position unless otherwise decided by the arbitrator.
The arbitrator's costs shall be paid by the Bureau.
Section 6. Effect of Arbitrator'sAward.
An arbitrator's decision shall be final and binding upon the
employee and the employer and may be enforced in the Court of
Common Please for the county in which the employment dispute
arose.
Section 7. Judicial Review.
The Court of Common Pleas for the county in which the
employment dispute arose shall review the arbitrator's award, upon
petition by the employee or employer filed within thirty (30)
calendar days after receipt of the arbitrator's award. The court's
review shall be limited to the following:
(a) There was evident partiality by the arbitrator or
corruption, fraud, or misconduct of the arbitrator prejudicing
the rights of the employee or the employer or
(b) The arbitrator exceeded his/her powers under this act.
The pendency of a proceeding for review by the Court of Common
Pleas or any further appeal to either the Superior Court in appeals
involving private sector employees or the Commonwealth Court in
appeals involving public sector employees, or in subsequent
appeals to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania shall not
automatically stay enforcement of the arbitrator's award. To receive
the benefit of a stay, either the employee or the employer shall
demonstrate some likelihood of success on appeal or extreme
prejudice.
Section 8. Enforcement of Award.
Either the employee or the employer as the prevailing party under
an arbitrator's award may seek enforcement of the award against
the noncomplying party by filing a petition with the Court of
Common Pleas in the county in which the employment law dispute
arose.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 38:723

Section 9. Contempt.
An employee or employer who disobeys a lawful order for the
enforcement of an arbitrator's award issued by any court of this
Commonwealth, may be held in contempt. The punishment for each
day that the contempt occurs shall be a fine as set by the court,
imprisonment, or any other enforcement measure deemed
appropriate.
Section 10. Conflict with Other Acts.
Initiation of this act's procedures, shall preclude an employee or
employer from using this act in addition to any similar proceedings
that may be contained under any other federal or state act that
provides a remedy for contesting the employment dispute. These
federal and state statutes include, but are not limited to those that
prohibit adverse employer action for filing complaints, charges, and
or claims with administrative bodies or that prohibit unlawful
discrimination based on race, national origin, sex, age, disability,
creed, religion, political belief, color, marital status, and other
similar grounds. Should proceedings be instituted under any of
these federal or state acts either prior to initiation of these
proceedings, during these proceedings, or anytime after these
proceedings have issued a final and binding arbitration award,
these proceedings and any award issued under them shall be
considered null and void. Initiation of proceedings under this act
shall be considered a waiver of any rights an employee or employer
may have under any other state act. Initiation of proceedings under
any similar federal act shall immediately terminate proceedings
under this act. The remedies and procedures of this act shall be
exclusive and shall not be construed to duplicate any other federal
or state act or be in addition thereto.
Section 11. Notice of this Act.
An employer shall post a copy of this act in a prominent place of
the work area.
Section 12. Severability.
If any provision, of this act or its application to any employee or
employer is held invalid, the invalidity shall not affect other
provisions or applications of this Act, which can be given effect
without the invalid provision or application, and to this end this

2000

Whistleblower Law's Extention to Private Sector

act's provisions are severable.
Section 13. Repealer.
This act repeals any and all acts inconsistent with
specifically repeals [list specific acts repealed].

it and

Section 14. Effective Date.
This act shall take effect 120 calendar days after enactment and
shall cover any employment dispute that occurs on or after the
act's effective date. This act shall not be retroactive; i.e., this Act
shall not apply to any employment dispute that occurs or arises
within 120 calendar days of this Act's effective date
E. Analysis of Proposed Statute
In comparison to statutory schemes for at-will employment's
modification that have been suggested within Pennsylvania 47 and
other jurisdictions, this proposal is unique. 248 Its scope is much
broader than allowing at-will employees the opportunity to sue only
over their terminations. The proposal offers an all-encompassing
regulatory scheme to set forth procedures for handling all
employment disputes between employees and employers.
Efforts to regulate this area must consider and balance both
employee and employer rights. Employees must be protected from
improper employer adverse actions and employers should be
accorded equal recourse against improper employee actions.
The proposed statute is intended to cover all employees and
employers in the public and private sectors. Only limited exclusions
are provided. An employee does not include anyone: (a) covered by
a collective bargaining agreement that contains a final and binding
arbitration procedure for, the review of all employment disputes
arising under or out of the agreement; (b) covered by an
employment handbook, employment manual, or employment policy
that contains a final and binding arbitration procedure for the
review of employment disputes arising out of the employment
relationship that permits the employee to participate in selecting a
neutral arbitrator with the employer and does not require the
employee to pay any charges or fees for the arbitrator's services;
(c) protected by a statutory civil service or tenure procedure of
247. See supra notes 198-212 and accompanying text.
248. See supra notes 159-197 and accompanying text.
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either the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania or any of its political
subdivisions, or any agency, authority, board, or commission
created by a political subdivision; (d) who has a written
employment agreement that contains a final and binding arbitration
procedure for the review of employment disputes arising out of or
under the agreement that permits the employee to participate in
selecting the neutral arbitrator with the employer and does not
require the employee to pay any charges or fees for the arbitrator's
services; or (e) that is in a probationary status. This term shall also
include the employee's representative for the purposes of filing a
complaint and appearing at the arbitration hearing.
An employment dispute under the proposed statute is defined
broadly. It is intended to mean any adverse employment action that
arises out of the employment relationship between an employee
and employer, including, but not limited to disputes arising over
discipline, termination, resignation, layoff, recall, demotion,
promotion, disloyalty, theft of trade secrets, unfair competition,
etc., that result from improper action or inaction of an employee or
employer. However, disputes relating to the receipt of
unemployment compensation and workers' compensation are
specifically excluded from this act's coverage and scope.
The standard to evaluate an improper adverse action by either an
employee or employer is simple. An employee or employer cannot
adversely effect the interests of the other in any manner that gives
rise to an employment dispute unless there is just cause for the
action or inaction that is not arbitrary, capricious, or
discriminatory. This standard is similar to that developed under
grievance arbitration procedures in the private and public
2 49
sectors.
A complaint's initiation requires simply the filing of an arbitration
request with the Bureau of Mediation. The proposed statute places
no additional burden on the Bureau of Mediation to administer it.
The Bureau already has available lists of arbitrators that it
considers competent to handle similar disputes. The employee and
employer are given the right to select the arbitrator from the list
provided by the Bureau.
The arbitration costs would be paid by the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, removing the financial burden from the employee to
discourage the act's use. At first, this may appear as an onerous
economic burden to place on the Commonwealth. However, this
249.

See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
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may, in fact, result in cost savings to it regarding the eventual
diminished use of administrative procedures that exist under other
state statutes which this act may replace. 250 Once employees and
employers realize that the proposed statute's arbitration procedure
is quicker and more efficient than the existing state administrative
procedures that cover similar disputes, the resulting decreased case
load before these administrative agencies should permit the
Commonwealth to reduce its funding for these administrative
agencies and use part of these savings to fund the proposed
statute's arbitrations.
The arbitration would be conducted like any other labor
arbitration. An arbitrator's award is final and binding on the
employee and employer, and can only be set aside by evidence that
there was partiality by the arbitrator or corruption or misconduct
of the arbitrator prejudicing the rights of the employee or the
employer or that the arbitrator exceeded his/her powers under the
act. Failure to conform to an arbitrator's award carries a contempt
penalty.
To discourage appeals of other than the most legitimate cases, no
automatic stay of enforcement is provided. This lends further to the
finality and binding quality of any arbitrator's award. To receive the
benefit of a stay, either the employee or the employer must
demonstrate some likelihood of success on appeal or extreme
prejudice.
The proposed statute is not intended to duplicate any other
remedies available for litigating employment disputes. All
employees must receive notice of the act. Finally, the act's effective
date is postponed for one hundred and twenty calendar days to
allow employees and employers to prepare for its implementation.
The proposed statute is an attempt to provide a quick, efficient,
and economical means for resolving employment disputes similar
to that found under collective

bargaining

agreements. 251 It is

intended as a point to renew discussions for addressing the needs
of both employees and employers in resolving employment disputes
250. For example, the Act of October 27, 1955, No. 222, 1955 Pa. Laws 744 (Act 222),
as amended gave Pennsylvania employees protection from discrimination arising out of the
employment relationship relating to race, color, familial status, religious creed, ancestry,
handicap or disability, age, sex, national origin the use of guide or animal because of
blindness, deafness or physical handicap of the user because the user is a handier of support
or guide animals. PA STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-963 (West 1991) ("Pennsylvania Human
Relations Act").
251.

See supra notes 222-223 and accompanying text.

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 38:723

better without recourse to an expensive litigation process and
judicial procedure that only prolongs these disputes' resolution.
CONCLUSIONS

The foregoing examination of the at-will employment doctrine
and its quarter century modification in Pennsylvania indicates that
the time has again arrived to review this important question. The
proposed statute serves as a step in the right direction to begin
discussion.
The law governing the at-will employment relationship in
Pennsylvania has moved forward considerably during the last
quarter century. 52 At the beginning of the last century, employees
had no right to bargain collectively. They were guaranteed neither a
minimum wage, a humane work schedule, or protection against
2
discrimination of any kind. 5
Pennsylvania has guaranteed the right to bargain collectively 25
255
and has taken great strides toward eliminating discrimination.
Yet, Pennsylvania still attempts to cling to the out-dated at-will
employment doctrine. 256 Millions of Pennsylvania employees serve
solely at the their employers' pleasure, subject to discipline and
termination for a good reason, a bad reason, no reason, with or
without notice. Pennsylvania's courts and its legislature have made
some inroads into protecting these employees. 5 7 As the new
millennium dawns, the time has again arrived for all interested
252. See supra notes 40-135 and accompanying text.
253. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
254. The Act of June 1, 1937, Act 294, 1937 Pa. Laws. 1168 (Act 294), established the
right of Pennsylvania's private sector employees to bargain collectively who were not
covered by the federal National Labor Relations Act. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 211.1-.13 (West
1991); see also 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994). The Act of June 24, 1968, Act 111, 1968 Pa. Laws
237 (Act 111), established the rights of Pennsylvania police and fire employees to organize
and bargain collectively through selected representatives; however, no strike right was
granted and disputes were to be resolved through final and binding arbitration. PA- STAT.
ANN. tit. 43, §§ 217.1-.10 (West 1991). All other Pennsylvania public employees were given the
right to organize and bargain collectively, including a limited strike right for certain public
employees, by the Act of July 23, 1970, No. 195, 1970 Pa. Laws 563 (Act 195). PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 43, §§ 1101.101-.2301 (West 1991).
255. The Act of October 27, 1955, No. 222, 1955 Pa. Laws 744 (Act 222), as amended
gave Pennsylvania employees protection from discrimdnation arising out of the employment
relationship relating to race, color, familial status, religious creed, ancestry, handicap or
disability, age, sex, national origin the use of guide or animal because of blindness, deafness
or physical handicap of the user because the user is a handler of support or guide animals.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 951-963 (West 1991 & Supp. 1999).
256. See supra notes 40-69 and accompanying text.
257. See supra notes 40-135 and accompanying text.
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parties to reexamine this area. 2-s No longer can employers ignore
the impact of these disputes. Pennsylvania courts have sent
25 9
sufficient warning signals for the initiation of legislative action.
Statutory regulation offers the most realistic manner in which to
confront the at-will employment doctrine's modification. The need
for reexamination of legislative solutions in this area is clear after a
quarter century of continued litigation to erode the doctrine.6 0 The
impact or viability of continuing to litigate this doctrine without a
final solution can now be assessed. Courts have continued to
develop a common law that encourages overburdening the judicial
system by failing to set forth specific guidelines. 261 This has been
costly for employees, employers, and an already overtaxed judicial
system. Consequently, at a minimum, the Pennsylvania Superior
Court's recent decisions in Riggio26 2 and Denton26 will only cause
additional litigation as private sector employees attempt to avail
themselves of the Whistleblower Law's2t 1 protections for public
policy violations, which only further complicate this unresolved
morass.

258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.
264.

See supra notes 6, 17 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 40-135 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 40-135 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 40-135 and accompanying text.
Riggio, 711 A.2d at 497.
Denton 739 A.2d at 571.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, §§ 1421-1428 (West 1991).

